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DOD weapon system and commodity managers currently are seeking to 
implement large scale automated procurement and information systems for sharing 
databases between DOD and contractor various contractor and subcontractor 
activities. A prevalent shared database system is the Continuous Acquisition and 
Life-Cycle Support (CALS) system and the associated Joint Continuous Acquisition 
and Life-Cycle Support (JCALS) system for major weapon system procurement. 
An important issue for the manager of any integrated, shared database is the 
protection of technical data rights for the information contained in the database. 
This study, through the use of personal interviews and surveys, determined 
that the existing dichotomy between the Government and industry concerning 
technical data protection can be bridged through standardization of the CALS 
program, simplification and clarification of governing policies and guidelines, and 
better use of inputs from system users. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A.   RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The Department of Defense (DOD) weapon system and 
commodity managers currently are attempting to implement 
large scale automated procurement and information systems 
for sharing databases between DOD and various contractor and 
subcontractor activities. A prevalent shared database 
system is the Continuous Acquisition and Life-Cycle Support 
(CALS) system for major weapon system procurement. An 
important issue facing the manager of any integrated, shared 
database is the protection of technical data rights for the 
information contained in the database. The procedure of 
sharing access to a large volume of technical data by both 
DOD and industry is complicated and could lead to a 
compromise of Government and industry data rights. 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and its 
Defense Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) recently 
have added detailed revisions to provide guidance for the 
protection of technical data rights for both the Government 
and industry activities.  There are conflicting 
interpretations of this guidance, however, by both industry 
and the Government.  Consequently, there is a dichotomy of 
understanding in the technical data protection arena.  These 
conflicts and misunderstandings, along with several other 
obstacles which are discussed later in this thesis result in 
delays in the implementation of the CALS and the Joint 
Continuous Acquisition and Life-Cycle Support (JCALS) 
programs. 
This thesis analyzes these areas to identify where 
changes in technical data rights might be required to 
successfully implement and utilize the CALS program. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is as follows: 
What action(s) must be taken by industry and the 
Government to allow both access to technical data and 
protection of proprietary technical data in the CALS 
environment? 
The following are the subsidiary research questions: 
(1) What is the impact of contractor restrictions on 
the Government's right to use and distribute technical data? 
(2) What is the impact of Government restrictions on 
the contractor's right to use, distribute, and own technical 
data? 
(3) What are the existing industry and Government 
shared data base contractual agreements for the delivery, 
retrieval, dissemination, and use of technical data? 
(4) What are the current methods for protecting 
restricted technical data in existing industry and 
Government shared automated information systems used by the 
DOD? What are the proposed methods for protecting 
restricted technical data in the CALS environment? 
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Scope 
The scope of this thesis is restricted to examining 
technical data rights issues existent between DOD and 
industry.  Since many DOD activities have not yet 
implemented CALS, this thesis focuses on activities that 
deal with CALS or a shared database computer system. 
2. Limitations 
Although DFARS 252.227-7013 (a) (18) includes computer 
software in the definition of "technical data," both the 
DFARS and FAR treat computer software separately through 
separate clauses.  For the purposes of this thesis, the uses 
of computer software rights are not analyzed. 
Also, the area of the treatment of technical data 
rights in international transactions are not discussed in 
this thesis. 
A total of twelve individuals from various departments 
of seven defense contractors and Government buying 
activities were part of the final survey process.  It is 
believed that this number is sufficient to achieve adequate 
findings establishing a baseline of data to apply to defense 
contractors as a whole. The lack of historical information 
due to a lack of previous research in this area and the 
short amount of time that CALS has been operational also 
limits the scope of this thesis. 
Currently, there are revisions of DFARS clause 252.227- 
7013, "Rights in Technical Data and Computer Software," and 
DFARS clause 227.4, "Rights in Data and Copyrights," pending 
public comment and approval from the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD (A&T)). At the 
time of the completion of this thesis, the revisions were 
not finalized.  This thesis utilizes the FAR and DFARS 
regulations dated April 1984. 
The proposed regulation changes are discussed in 
Chapter II.  Possible ramifications of changes in the 
existing regulations are analyzed in Chapter III of this 
thesis. 
3.  Assumptions 
Although this thesis contains explanations and 
definitions of topic-specific words and concepts, it is 
written and worded with the assumption that the reader has a 
basic working knowledge of the procurement process and of 
its jargon.  A complete listing of these topic-specific 
terms are included as Appendix A: Glossary of Terms. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The remaining portions of this research are organized 
by providing the inputs gathered from the respondents of the 
interview followed by an analysis of the data, not only in 
the context of the surveys, but in terms of the existing DOD 
regulations and policies governing technical data rights. A 
conclusion and recommendation section follows. 
E. METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH GATHERING 
Information used in this thesis was obtained primarily 
through three methods: literature search, telephone 
conversations, and written survey. 
In addition to periodical index guides and various 
library catalogs, extensive use of the Defense Logistics 
Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) and the Defense 
Technical Information Center (DTIC) was made.  Relevant 
books, articles, and other documents are cited in the List 
of References. 
Over forty telephone conversations were conducted 
during the course of gathering information.  These 
conversations were with Government executive agencies, 
Government purchasing agencies, private contracting firms, 
and task groups.  Many of the initial conversations were 
used to determine the activity's exposure to technical data 
rights issues and the CALS program.  This familiarity was 
established through the use of preliminary surveys 
(Appendices B and C).  These responses were then used to 
construct a final version of the surveys (Appendices D and 
E) which were issued.  A balance between Government-based 
and company-based questions was sought.  While the 
literature search gave the researcher a strong indication of 
the theories and technical aspects of the subject matter, 
the telephone conversations and surveys provided details of 
how these areas were dealt with in real life.  Based on the 
information received from the literature review and the 
conversations and surveys, it could be concluded that there 
is a need to reduce the dichotomy of understanding that 
exists between industry and the Government concerning 
technical data rights in a shared database environment. The 
resultant task is then seen to define this dichotomy, 
examine the current restrictions used by industry and the 
Government, and identify the procedures which could be used 
to satisfy the requirements of both interested parties. 

II.  BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To best understand the current importance and future 
impact of technical data and technical data rights, it is 
best to review the general, historical background of CALS 
leading to some of the current regulations, policies, and 
attitudes. 
An explanation of the categories of Government data 
rights will be defined, followed by a discussion of both the 
present Government regulations and policies and the proposed 
regulation revisions. Next, the procedure used by the 
Government to determine the technical data required for an 
acquisition will be presented.  To conclude this section, a 
discussion of how this thesis can be applied in a work 
environment will be included. 
B. CALS BACKGROUND 
In the mid-1980's, a perceived need to reduce weapon 
system design time and documentation costs within the 
Department of Defense evolved into the Continuous 
Acquisition Life-Cycle Support (CALS) initiative.  This 
initiative sought to address the integration and use of 
digitized technical data for weapon system engineering, 
manufacturing, and logistics.  The CALS initiative is a 
technology that will enable digital technical data to more 
effectively and efficiently support the acquisition of 
weapon systems.  A key element of this initiative is to 
provide common data interchange standards by DOD and 
industry so that every computer operating system can be used 
and compatibility between the Government and industry 
computer languages is achieved. [Ref.l, p.1-3] 
According to the "CALS Architecture Study," the sheer 
volume of technical information is mindboggling.  The study 
states that nearly one billion  aperture cards containing 
technical data on spare parts for weapon systems, and 
approximately one million different technical manuals 
consisting of hundreds of pages of text and illustrations 
require annual updates of millions of pages. The weapon 
systems manuals onboard a Ticonderoga-class Navy cruiser 
weigh 26 tons.  [Ref.2, p.3]  A goal of CALS is to digitize 
virtually all technical information and drawings for defense 
equipment and to develop the ability for the Government and 
industry computers to share those data. 
[Ref.2, p.3] 
There have been several realignments of organizational 
relationships for CALS.  Originally, CALS was placed under 
the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production 
and Logistics) (ASD (P&L)). After three realignments of the 
CALS organization, CALS is now under the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology)/CALS (OUSD 
(A&T)/CALS). (See Appendix F)  The CALS management structure 
also includes various DOD components.  Each of the Military 
Departments and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) have 
established a CALS office to coordinate the efforts in their 
respective organizations.  [Ref.3, p.4-5]  The CALS 
initiative involves three areas: 1) weapon systems 
acquisition, 2) information systems, and 3) contract 
support.  The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) analyzes CALS 
requirements for weapon system requirements.  The scope of 
this analysis includes the contractors' technical 
information systems and processes, delivery of the technical 
data in a digital format, and Government access to 
contractor data.  The Major Automated Information System 
Review Council reviews CALS requirements for automated 
information systems.  Areas that are analyzed include data 
interchange and access requirements, and acquisition of 
computer hardware and software.  In the realm of contract 
support, there are approximately 128 weapon systems 
acquisition programs and 62 contractors using CALS 
technology.  [Ref.3, p.8] 
The joint CALS (JCALS) system is designed to implement 
joint-Service functional requirements for digital data. 
JCALS also provides the infrastructure required to acquire, 
process, and distribute technical data in support of weapon 
systems.  It is imperative for JCALS to provide a good 
communications network between OUSD (A&T)/CALS, the Service 
component CALS offices, and the weapon system program 
managers to allow database connectivity between each weapon 
system.  The scope of JCALS has recently been expanded.  In 
1994, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Procurement & Logistics) (OASD (P&L)) designated JCALS as 
being the lead program for developing and implementing CALS 
capabilities, including the Integrated Weapon System 
Database (IWSDB), throughout DOD.  The Army acts as the lead 
Service for JCALS.  [Ref.3, p.14] 
During the 1980's, the need to comply with statutory 
competition requirements and public criticism of DOD spare 
parts pricing practices prompted DOD to demand greater 
amounts of technical data from its contractors and require 
the contractors to provide the data without restrictions on 
the Government's rights to use, release, or disclose the 
data.  Several military department data requirements 
policies raised concerns among industry, particularly toward 
DOD demands that developers of data deliver unlimited rights 
in privately developed items to permit other manufacturers 
to compete in the areas of additional items or spare parts. 
[Ref.4, p.3-4]  To increase Governmental control, Congress 
enacted a series of technical data statutes and the 
President issued Executive Order number 12591 in April 1987 
requiring various executive agencies to formulate a uniform 
data rights policy giving contractors data ownership under 
Federal contracts except when the Government specifically 
purchases the data as part of the contract. [Ref.4, p.4] 
1.  Data Rights Categories 
Government Purpose License Rights (GPLR) is a new 
category of technical data established by a revision of 
DFARS 252.227-7013 (Rights in Technical Data and Computer 
Software) in May 1987.  According to DFARS 252.227-7013, the 
other existing categories of DOD rights in technical data 
delivered under contract are: 1) unlimited rights, giving 
DOD the right to use, duplicate, or disclose the technical 
data in any way, for any purpose, to anyone, or to the whole 
world; and 2) limited rights, giving DOD the right to use 
the data for internal Government purposes only. DFARS 
252.227-7013 (a)(15)(i) states that DOD may not disseminate 
or expose limited rights data outside the Government without 
the written permission of the contractor or the 
subcontractor that created the data except, a) when needed 
for emergency repair and overhaul, or b) for limited use by 
foreign governments for evaluation or information. 
The GPLR category recognizes scenarios where both the 
contractor and Government contribute funds to develop the 
data item or the process that the data describes (mixed 
funding scenarios).  As per the initial wording of the 
clause, data rights were then allocated according to the 
money contributed by each party for data development via the 
"50% Rule."  The "50% Rule" is best described by example. 
If a contractor's percentage of contribution (POC) was 50% 
or less, the Government would receive unlimited rights.  If 
the contractor's POC was between 51% and 99%, the Government 
would receive GPLR.  If the contractor's POC was 100%, the 
Government would receive limited rights.  [Ref.4, p.5] 
The benefits received by the Government from GPLR 
rights are that the Government may disclose or provide GPLR 
data to a third party that has executed the Standard Non- 
Disclosure Agreement.  This agreement establishes a third 
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party status for the contractor identified in the GPLR 
legend. The Government and the third party may only use the 
data for Government purposes only. These Government 
purposes would be any activity in which the United States 
Government is a party, including cooperative agreements with 
international or multi-national defense organizations, or 
sales or transfers by the United States Government to 
foreign governments or international organizations. 
Government purposes include competitive procurement, but do 
not include the rights to use, modify, reproduce, release, 
perform, display, or disclose technical data for commercial 
purposes or authorize others to do so. [Ref.4, p.2] 
Therefore, the Government gets to use the data for 
Government purposes without having to spend the extra money 
for unlimited rights.  The company gets to maintain rights 
to the data that might otherwise be procured by the 
Government, plus they may have a designated time in which 
they have exclusive commercial rights for the data as well. 
According to DFARS 227.403-70 (6)(c)(3), these time 
limits may be expressed in the contract and should normally 
be no less than one year nor more that five years after the 
estimated date of first production delivery to the 
Government to which the technical data pertains.  These time 
limits may be increased by mutual agreement. 
Technical data having a rights restriction category of 
other than unlimited shall not be released to sources 
outside the Government unless the data release is subject to 
disclosure prohibition.  If the data are subject to GPLR 
rights, the contractor must sign a non-disclosure agreement 
form.  Therefore, in accordance with DFARS 227.403-70 
(d)(3),the data will be used only for Government purposes. 
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2.   Policies 
a. Current Government 
There are many factors involved in the acquisition 
of technical data. These include design complexity and 
stability, expected inventory life of the system, and cost. 
Ordering technical data from contractors is very 
expensive.  The decision to procure data should be made only 
after carefully deciding whether the potential benefits are 
more than the cost of the data itself.  [Ref.6]  It is DOD's 
general policy to obtain only the minimum essential data 
needed.  As DFARS 222.402-71 states: "The Department of 
Defense shall obtain only the minimum essential technical 
data and data rights." DOD Instruction (DODI) 5000.2 
states: 
Only the minimum data needed to permit cost-effective 
support of research, development, provisioning, training, 
operation, maintenance, and related logistics functions over 
the life cycle of the item will be acquired. 
In real-life application, this policy is often challenged 
because of the common confusion over the need  for technical 
data and with the desire  for technical data.  In this 
context, "need" is typically defined as the minimum 
technical data that are required to meet a requirement, 
whereas "desire" is usually defined as the maximum technical 
data available for a requirement. [Ref.6]  DOD will 
frequently acquire technical data to fill its needs  with 
little regard to cost.  Many representatives of private 
industry are concerned however, that the Government seeks 
ownership of technical data based on desires instead of 
needs.  [Ref.6,7,8] 
As discussed later in this thesis, this concern is 
critical in a shared database environment such as CALS due 
to industry beliefs that Government ownership and control of 
technical data causes possible retardation of 
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commercialization and product or service differentiation. 
[Ref.7, 9] 
The DFARS' Rights in Technical Data and Computer 
Software clause was revised again in April 1988 and called 
for DOD to drop the "50% Rule" in favor of individual case 
negotiations.  [Ref.4, p.6]  Although the need to be able to 
demonstrate that technical data developed at private expense 
still exists, this new policy greatly increases the 
promotion of commercialization of technology by allowing the 
data developers to claim GPLR and commercialization rights 
in a greater number of cases.  GPLR is a negotiated factor 
that can be awarded irrespective of the contractor's POC. 
[Ref.4, p.7] 
On 28 October 1988, the Defense Acquisition Regulatory 
Council (DARC) published a revision of the April 1988 rule. 
[Ref.4, p.8]  A summary of the changes are: 
1) The revision makes a clearer statement regarding the 
Government's policy on protecting technical data 
pertaining to privately developed commercial items. 
It is not the Government's policy to obtain 
technical data rights or technical data for 
competitive acquisition of privately developed 
commercial items. [Ref.4, p.8] 
2) The process of establishing rights in data have been 
clarified and simplified.  The listing of privately 
funded technical data does not accelerate the 
validation of the data and is not a final 
determination of rights.  Also, the former 
provisions included in DFARS 252.227-7035 (Preaward 
Notification) and 252.227-7038 (Listing and 
Certification of Development of Technology with 
Private Funding) have merged into the basic data 
rights clause- DFARS 252.227-7013. [Ref.4, p.9] 
3) There is additional emphasis on the responsibility 
of prime contractors to recognize and protect their 
subcontractors' data rights, while satisfying their 
contracts with the Government. [Ref.4, p.9] 
4) A revision of the definition of "required as an 
element of performance under a Government contract 
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or subcontract" was to include only development that 
was both accomplished during, and necessary for, 
performance of a Government contract or subcontract. 
[Ref.4, p.9] 
5) The provisions in the April 1988 interim rule that 
the Government would have unlimited rights xn any 
data not included in a list in the contract are 
eliminated. [Ref.4, p.10] 
6) The requirement that offerors and contractors submit 
development cost data when notifying the Government 
that items were developed in part at private expense 
is deleted. However, the contracting officer may 
still request these data when necessary. [Ref.4, p. 
10] 
b.     Current Industry 
While the policies of the Government are 
delineated in the above regulations, the policies of 
industry are difficult to determine.  There are several 
rules of thumb that seem to govern industry attitudes and 
actions concerning technical data rights.  One is that the 
intellectual property of a particular company is extremely 
important to its competitive standing. Service, engineering 
and high-technology businesses survive on product or service 
differentiation.  [Ref.7, 9]  The ideas and processes 
described in technical data submissions are a prime means 
for achieving this differentiation.  Another rule of thumb 
is that companies feel that if they have contributed 
resources to the creation of technical data, they want 
ownership.  [Ref.7]  Patents, copyrights and classification 
of data as trade secrets are methods used by companies to 
seek to protect the technical data. [Ref.7, 10]  The 
prevailing belief in most Government contracting activities 
is that the Government buys too much technical data and 
doesn't protect licensed data adequately. [Ref.7, 8, 9, 10] 
14 
c.    Proposed 
In November 1991, the formation of a Government- 
Industry Technical Data Committee began under direction 
contained within the Fiscal Year 1992/1993 National Defense 
Authorization Act. The committee was comprised of 
representatives of the Government, developers of technical 
data, and non-developers such as spare parts or additional 
item businesses. The committee was required to make 
recommendations for final regulations to implement 10 U.S.C. 
2320, "Rights in Technical Data." [Ref.4, p.6] 
The findings of the committee involve 7 major 
topics of concern for this study.  These topics are 
summarized below by major topic along with the crucial 
arguments of each group of representatives.  Further 
analysis of these proposed changes can be found in Chapter 
IV of this thesis. 
(1)  Allocating Data Rights.  10 U.S.C. 2320 
generally allocates rights in technical data in accordance 
with the source of funds used for the development of the 
technical data. 
The Government desires that funding continue 
to be used as the allocation basis for these data rights. 
They believe there is less delay in the procurement action 
and in administrative time and cost.  [Ref.4, p.7] 
The data developers, or Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMs), desire to have a default rights 
restriction category of limited rights assigned to 
Government procurements.  Their argument continues in their 
belief that Government's minimum needs are satisfied with 
limited rights.  [Ref.4, p.7] 
The data non-developers, who are usually 
involved in spare parts sales and direct foreign sales, 
desire the Government to have unlimited rights for the data 
the Government has wholly funded.  The more rights held by 
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the Government means more technical data available to them 
to conduct their business. [Ref.4, p.7] 
The committee concludes that the source of 
funds test is a reasonable basis in determining technical 
data rights.  Implementing regulations will emphasize that 
all Government rights will be derived from a license granted 
by the contractor. [Ref.4, p.8] 
(2)  Defining Developed Data.  10 U.S.C. 2320 
requires the Secretary of Defense to provide a definition 
for the term "developed" as it relates to technical data. 
Generally, the earlier an item or process is defined as 
developed, the less likely it is that development involved 
Government funds.  Thus, this concept is very important for 
industry and Government to define and determine in order to 
provide a basis for data rights ownership. [Ref.4, p.8] 
"Development" is defined by two concepts, 
existence and workability.  If an item exists, it has been 
constructed.  A process exists if it has been practiced. 
Workability requires substantial testing or analysis to 
demonstrate that it has a high probability of operating as 
intended.  [Ref.4, p.8] 
The Government representatives are not in favor of 
using Computer-Aided Design (CAD) and other computer 
simulation tools to act as substitute procedures for actual 
testing of these concepts.  They feel that computer 
simulation is not sufficient to show adequate assurance that 
an item can be built.  They argue that there is a difference 
between the "as-built" item that actually is produced and 
the "as-designed" item in accordance with the computer 
simulation.  They go further to state that there is case law 
that supports the existence concept and that simulation does 
not equate to existence. [Ref.4, p.9] 
Representatives of the OEMs contend that 
tools such as CAD effectively eliminate the "reduction to 
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practice" criterion of the existence concept and that CAD 
does indeed provide the required assurance to prove 
workability. [Ref.4, p.9] 
The non-developers opined that "actual" 
workability was preferred to "likely" workability. They 
offered that the test for existence should be the same as 
the patent law test of "bringing to the point of practical 
application."  [Ref.4, p.9] 
(3)  Indirect Costs.  10 U.S.C. 2320 requires 
the Secretary of Defense to define the terms "exclusively 
with Federal funds" and "exclusively at private expense." 
The statute also directs the Secretary to specify the 
treatment of indirect costs other than independent research 
and development (IR&D) costs or bid or proposal (B&P) costs 
which 10 U.S.C. 2320 (a)(3) identifies as private expense. 
[Ref.4, p.11] 
"Exclusively with Federal funds" is defined 
by the current data regulation as all developmental costs 
paid for by the Government or that development was required 
for the performance of a Government contract or subcontract. 
[Ref.4, p.11]  "Required for the performance of a Government 
contract or subcontract" is defined by the current data 
regulation as meaning that the development of an item or 
component was specified in a contract or that development 
was accomplished during and was necessary for performance of 
a Government contract or subcontract. [Ref.5, part 227]  It 
is this phrase that proves to be the most difficult to 
interpret and to reach agreement on. 
The Government representatives are concerned 
over the possibility of the OEMs "cherry picking." This 
occurs when the contractor chooses the most valuable, 
commercially appealing intellectual property and develops it 
with private funds while using less "attractive" 
intellectual property for Government contracts.  [Ref.4, 
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p.12] 
The OEMs state that it is unfair for the 
Government to be able to get unlimited rights on 
intellectual property that has been developed while 
performing a Government contract, but privately funded. 
They believe these private funds are not directly related to 
the Government contract and, therefore, the intellectual 
property and technical data developed are not subject to 
restriction. [Ref.4, p.12] 
The non-developers argue that the OEMs' 
suggestion results in technical data rights being a result 
of the company's accounting system rather than by actual 
funding.  Although FAR Parts 30 (Cost Accounting Standards) 
and 31 (Cost Principles) prohibit indiscriminant changes to 
the method in which a firm may allocate indirect and direct 
costs, the non-developers believe that OEMs practice this 
procedure and will be more apt to do so if the OEMs' 
suggestion is carried out.  [Ref.4, p.12] 
The second aspect examined is the concept of 
"exclusively at private expense."  Currently, the technical 
data regulation in DFARS 252.227-7013 (a)(15)(i) defines 
this as: 
...no part of the development cost being paid by the 
Government and development was not required for the 
performance of a Government contract or subcontract. 
The primary concern voiced by the data 
developers is that data funded from non-Government funds are 
developed exclusively at private expense and should be 
wholly owned by themselves. [Ref.4, p.12] 
(4)  Mixed Funding Situations.  10 U.S.C. 
2320(a)(2)(e) requires the Government and its contractors to 
negotiate rights in data pertaining to items or processes 
developed at mixed expense except when the Secretary Of 
18 
Defense determines that, based upon criteria contained in 
the implementing regulations, negotiations would not be 
practicable. 
The Government representatives feel that 
there should be a fixed GPLR license for every mixed funding 
situation.  While the Government would have the right to 
use, release, or disclose data for Government purposes to a 
third party, the data developer would have a limited time 
period in which to have exclusive rights to commercialize 
the property.  After this limited time, the Government would 
gain unlimited rights to the data. [Ref.4, p.13] 
The OEMs claim that Government has 
historically demanded unlimited rights in mixed funding 
situations.  Also, they desire to have perpetual disclosure 
protection instead of for five years.  They feel that if the 
situation warrants, modifications to the standard data 
rights agreement should be authorized by mutual agreement 
during negotiations. [Ref.4, p.13] 
The non-developers see this as another method 
to restrict their use of the OEMs' technical data.  They 
suggest that the term "Government purpose" be re-written 
because they feel that direct foreign sales act the same as 
Government foreign sales except the Government doesn't 
receive the commission.  They add that the committee's 
suggestions for additional assistance for the non-developers 
to conduct this business will compel the OEMs to relinquish 
their data rights. [Ref.4, p.13] 
The committee made three recommendations in 
these areas: 1) a fixed set of Government purpose license 
rights with a nominal five year baseline commencing at 
contract award, with the possibility of negotiation for non- 
standard data rights when the situation warranted;  2) limit 
the use of Government purpose license rights data to 
Governmental purposes including competition, and;  3) 
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require that third party users be subject to non-disclosure 
statements that will be executed on behalf of the data 
owner.  [Ref.4, p.13] 
(5) Commercial Items.  OEM representatives 
voice their opinion that separate data requirements are 
needed for commercial items.  While it is acknowledged that 
DFARS 211 did that, the contractors have concerns about the 
10 U.S.C. 2320 (a)(2)(c)(ii) provision that exempts form, 
fit, or function data from contractor or subcontractor 
restriction. They state that this portion of the statute 
hinders their company's commercial business because of 
possible disclosure. They would like to see DFARS 211 
replaced with policy guidance concerning separation of 
commercial and non-commercial items, along with a DFARS 227 
contract clause requiring negotiation of licensing rights 
whenever the Government decided it needs data rights for the 
commercial item(s). [Ref.4, p.13] 
Government representatives agree with 
industry representatives on the need to consolidate 
additional technical data requirements in DFARS 227.4. 
However, the Government feels that there is a need for a 
separate, standard contract clause to grant the Government 
unlimited rights that are exempt from disclosure 
restrictions in 10 U.S.C. 2320 (a)(2)(c) and (a)(2)(d) and 
prohibit the release or disclosure of other commercial data 
without the permission of the contractor.  The Committee 
supports the Government's proposal. [Ref.4, p.13] 
(6) Copyrights.  The Government wants 
specific enumeration of copyright license rights to 
accompany the rights granted by data rights licenses.  They 
believe that the rights associated with copyrights are not 
identical to the rights associated with technical data.  The 
representatives also seek to clarify the industry's 
interpretation of the phrase "Government purposes" in DFARS 
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252.227-7013 (e)(1). They define it to be only a limiting 
factor under which the Government can allow other people to 
use copyrighted technical data prepared for or acquired for 
the Government under contract. [Ref.4, p.13] 
The OEMs and non-developers support the 
enumeration recommendation. However, they do not want the 
wording to be such that the copyright license rights are "in 
addition to" those rights associated with data rights 
license, due to their belief that it will expand the scope 
of the technical data rights license. [Ref.4, p.14] 
The committee combines the copyright license 
with the data rights license.  They recommend that the 
contractor or licensor grant to or obtain for the 
Government, license rights to reproduce, modify, perform, 
display, or distribute the data protected by copyright. 
[Ref.4, p.14] 
3.  Procedure 
From the preceding section, one quickly realizes that 
there is a myriad of regulations and policies that are 
required to be followed by both industry and the Government 
relating to the delivery of technical data.  While these 
topics are being discussed and reviewed, the fact still 
remains that both industry and the Government need to 
conduct everyday business that involves technical data and 
technical data rights.  This section will provide insight as 
to how the Government determines their technical data 
requirements. 
The Government needs to be able to properly support, 
maintain, and repair the systems it procures. Technical 
data are needed to develop this support capability. Without 
technical data, the essential functions listed in DODI 
5000.2 cannot be successfully implemented. 
A question that remains is how the Government 
determines the minimum essential technical data needs are 
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determined.  The answer is the "data call." [Ref.11, p.7] 
The "data call" procedure begins as the contract 
solicitation is developed. The Integrated Logistics Support 
(ILS) manager assigned to the acquisition will promulgate 
the Statement of Work (SOW) and other pertinent documents 
associated with the procurement to all of the logistics 
element managers.  These element managers are concerned 
specifically with such areas as maintenance engineering, 
technical manuals, and initial parts provisioning.  They 
will consider the potential technical information that will 
be required for the life cycle of the item. [Ref.11, p.8] 
The ILS manager sends the results of the data call to 
the technical data manager for review.  DODI 5000.2 requires 
that a data requirements review board be established to 
review all data call recommendations and advise the Program 
Manager as to their findings.  When the acquisition has a 
potential cost of $5 million or more, the review board must 
convene before the solicitation is issued. [Ref.12, p.9-B-3] 
Each data requirement that is approved by the board is 
listed on the Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL), DD 
Form 1423.  The CDRL becomes an element of the contract. 
Each data requirement must be related to a specific task in 
the SOW and fully describe the item and its delivery. 
[Ref.11, p.7] 
Prices for the items listed on the CDRL may be 
negotiated.  Changes to or deletions of CDRL items may be 
unilaterally acted upon by the contracting officer through 
the changes clause of the contract.  If the requirements are 
deemed to be too excessive or too expensive, the contracting 
officer may eliminate that requirement while possibly 
subjecting the Government to equitable adjustment actions. 
[Ref.7]  While this procedure appears to provide the minimum 
essential technical data, there are several elements at work 
to reduce efficiency.  The majority of the data requirements 
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for an item are determined when the costs associated with 
the item are uncertain. Many logisticians will tend to 
order the maximum amount of available data to ensure 
logistics needs are served.  In this case, the quantity of 
data is determined by desire, not cost. Therefore, cost is 
not the determining factor in this situation and the result 
is ordering more data than is absolutely necessary. [Ref.7] 
The particular pressures placed upon the procurement 
action are also at work.  If the procurement schedule is the 
primary concern, the tendency will be toward requiring more 
technical data. The additional technical data helps provide 
information that can assist in end-item procurement and 
serves as documentation of procurement actions.  If cost is 
the primary concern, the tendency will be toward requiring 
less technical data. [Ref.11, p.9]  In either case, the 
probability of having the minimum essential technical data 
is significantly reduced because these concerns are not 
equal for any one procurement. 
4.  Application 
There have been several concepts identified in this 
introduction that can be used in understanding how technical 
data and technical data rights affect each procurement 
professional.  One should come away from this first section 
with the understanding that there is a dichotomy of 
understanding between Government and industry in not only 
the written policies and regulations that govern this area, 
but also in the general attitudes and beliefs of these 
parties.  While there have been strides taken to eliminate 
this dichotomy, there are still many areas to examine. 
This study is intended to benefit current and future 
CALS users who are and who will be dealing with these 
topics. By increasing the understanding of technical data 
and what the restrictions are when dealing with technical 
data, these users will work smarter and more efficiently. 
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Since CALS is currently focused on major weapon system 
procurement, those associated hardware commands are the 
current target audience. However, the understanding of 
shared database computer systems is a growth area in 
Government procurement that will be increasingly important 
in the future. 
The ultimate goal of this study is to allow a faster 
implementation process of not only the CALS system, but 
other shared database systems as well. 
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III.  DATA PRESENTATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The data gathered for this thesis through personal and 
telephone interviews and surveys are of a subjective nature. 
There is no adequate standard that could be used to derive 
statistical information and there is a lack of historical 
analytical information dealing with shared database system 
use. 
This chapter first analyzes the survey itself. A 
discussion of the question structure, and the facilitating 
role of the survey is followed by presentations of the data 
for the major topical issues addressed by the survey: 1) the 
restrictions placed upon technical data by the contractors 
and by the Government agencies and the origins of those 
restrictions, 2) shared database concerns in the commercial 
and Government marketplace, 3) protective actions used for 
proprietary property, 4) the impetus for technical data 
acquisition by the Government, and 5) the impact of CALS on 
technical data rights and proprietary property. 
At the end of this chapter, the reader should have a 
good understanding of the dichotomy that exists between 
Government and industry towards technical data through a 
discussion of data concerning what is believed and what 
actually is being done in the field by both the Government 
and industry. 
B. SURVEY 
The structure of the survey was intended to meet two 
primary objectives: clearly present information that helped 
in answering the thesis research questions, and provide a 
channel for communications between the interviewer and 
interviewee. 
In order to meet those objectives, the questions were 
structured in an open-ended format.  If the interviewee 
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wished to answer more than what was directly called for by 
the question, he or she was encouraged to do so. Also to 
meet these objectives, the questions were carefully selected 
from the preliminary surveys (Appendices B and C)•  The 
topics that had received the most interest and discussion 
during those preliminary surveys were chosen to be in the 
final surveys (Appendices D and E). This narrowing of 
topics also served to keep the survey at a manageable 
length.  The questions selected equally represent the 
Government and industry concerns.  Subsequently, there were 
approximately the same number of questions that dealt with 
the Government marketplace as with the commercial 
marketplace. 
There were thirty surveys distributed to preliminary 
interviewees which had expressed some working experience 
with CALS or another type of shared database system.  Twelve 
surveys were completed and returned. Due to this relatively 
small number of responses, statistical analysis was not 
warranted and therefore not conducted. 
C.  RESTRICTIONS AND ORIGINS 
Through the responses to the survey questions and 
associated follow-on questions in the same topical area, it 
is learned that when the Government develops a requirement 
that will include technical data, the technical data 
requirement will be stated in section H, special contract 
requirements, or section I, contract clauses, of the 
solicitation.  [Ref.13] This statement usually includes a 
description of the data required, the desired format, and 
may also include the restriction category sought, i.e. 
limited, unlimited, or GPLR.  [Ref.13] 
For major weapon systems, the technical data 
requirements are first addressed in the acquisition plan for 
that particular program.  This acquisition plan is to be 
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approved at Milestone I by the Milestone Decision Authority 
(MDA).  It is the responsibility of the Procuring 
Contracting Officer (PCO) to determine the amount and type 
of technical data requested by the Government.  If the PCO 
determines that a change to the technical data amount or 
type is required, he/she may either unilaterally or 
bilaterally delete the technical data from the CDRL during 
negotiations.  [Ref.7] 
Upon receipt of the solicitation, the potential offeror 
carefully analyzes the technical data requirements.  If they 
already possess technical information of the same type, they 
may quickly see what type of protection such as copyrights 
or patents are applied to the information.  If the technical 
data would have to be developed, the company's technical 
engineers are tasked to determine if the data could be 
developed, at what expense the development would be, and if 
there would be any type of rights restrictions the company 
would wish to place upon the data.  This determination of 
rights restrictions is usually made by an in-house board of 
experts comprised of technical, legal, and business 
representatives. [Ref.7]  The decision that they reach is 
put into the company's proposal.  This process of pre- 
notification of rights in technical data is mandated by 
DFARS 252.227-7013 (j). 
The proposal will address the technical data that are 
available and whether they already exist or will need to be 
developed.  It will also indicate the initial rights 
restrictions that the company deems appropriate.  In 
response, the Government will look at the overall proposal 
and determine if the company will be considered for possible 
negotiations that may include negotiations regarding the 
rights restrictions requested by both parties. [Ref.10] 
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D.  SHARED DATABASE IN THE MARKETPLACE 
The survey responses concerning the importance of 
technical data in the commercial marketplace show that 
technical data and intellectual property often serve as the 
key for the company's competitive edge by providing product 
differentiation. Several companies stated that technical 
data are becoming even more important due to the shrinking 
defense market and are vital to provide competitive 
advantage in both the commercial and Government markets. 
The type of business that the company is involved in 
significantly alters the impact that technical data have on 
the business.  The maximum impact of technical data is on a 
company involved in a minimal product line, multiple market 
applications (commercial and Government), and a high 
technology area.  In any combination of these areas, the 
protection afforded to the intellectual property by the 
company is increased when compared to the converse 
condition. [Ref.13] 
There is also an indication from the surveys that 
companies compare the attractiveness of the market and 
potential safety of their intellectual property when 
deciding what market to place their emphasis on.  "Market 
attractiveness" was defined in the context of technical data 
rights as being a right restriction categorization that is 
usually attached to the technical information.  Technical 
data and intellectual property ownership conditions are 
looked at as well.  The companies are extremely interested 
in ownership and control of the intellectual property.  They 
want to know what occurs in data development funding 
contribution scenarios and how associated FAR/DFARS 
regulations impact their data rights. 
A clear indication by a majority of the survey 
responses indicates that companies hold back some of their 
most sensitive proprietary information from the Government. 
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These companies are afraid that the Government will take 
over ownership of their proprietary information by claiming 
"national interests" and will make that information 
available to the company's rivals in the name of 
competition.  In a 1991 study conducted by the Proprietary 
Industries Association, 75% of the companies questioned 
stated that they had indeed withheld their latest technical 
data from DOD activities.  Eighty-three percent of the 
companies had refused participation in DOD procurement 
actions due to disputes over technical data rights. Thirty- 
three percent of the companies stated that they were 
planning to quit doing business with the DOD altogether 
because of technical data reasons.  [Ref.11, p.12-13] 
The majority of company responses stated that they did 
not have trouble with technical data rights when dealing 
with commercial firms but did have trouble with the 
Government.  The majority of the responding companies stated 
that they used some type of written agreement that dealt 
directly with proprietary information and technical data 
exchange.  However, one contracting manager for a major 
defense company stated that this was particularly difficult 
to understand since most of the arguments centered around 
formats that were for data totally funded by the Government 
and therefore owned by the Government. 
Many of the company representative responses indicated 
that they were also using teaming arrangements between 
companies in the development of new sensitive intellectual 
property.  In this situation, two parties jointly develop 
the proprietary information.  The rights to the technical 
data are negotiated by the teaming companies prior to the 
development of the information. 
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E*  PROTECTIVE ACTIONS 
According to the responses received from the survey, 
there are several methods used by industry and the 
Government to protect their proprietary property and 
technical data:  the use of FAR and DFARS clauses, 
copyrights, patents, and trade secrets. 
1.  FAR and DFARS Clauses 
The first of these protective measures is the use of 
the DFARS clauses 252.227-7013, "Rights in Technical Data 
and Software" and 252.227-7018, "Restrictive Markings on 
Technical Data." Most solicitations submitted to industry 
include one or more data rights clauses. [Ref.14] 
The "Rights in Technical Data and Software" clause 
describes the manner in which ownership rights are 
determined on the basis of funding origins.  As earlier 
discussed in this thesis, this aspect is being considered 
for possible modification.  DFARS clause 252.227-7013 also 
provides a definition of the data rights categories, along 
with the associated legend that is attached to each piece of 
data subject to those rights restrictions. 
DFARS 252.227-7018, the "Restrictive Markings on 
Technical Data" clause, gives instructions to the firm on 
exactly how to mark their technical data in order for the 
contracting officer to realize what restrictions are being 
sought by the firm. [Ref.5, part 252] 
The majority of the survey respondents stated that it 
was very important for them to have their technical data 
properly marked and to have the data included as a 
deliverable item on the Contract Data Requirements List 
(CDRL).  If the data are not marked, the Government may 
treat them as unlimited rights data.  DFARS 252.227-7037 
allows the contracting officer the availability to request a 
written justification by the contractor for any data 
restrictions if the basis for the restriction cannot be 
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ascertained by the contracting officer. This same clause 
also allows the contracting officer to challenge the 
restrictive markings. The contractor's or subcontractor's 
written response to the contracting officer's final decision 
is handled under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978.  The 
majority of the industry and Government survey responses 
show that neither of these actions usually occur due to time 
constraints in the procurement action. 
All of the contract administrators who responded to the 
survey stated that they were required to know DFARS clause 
252.227-7013(j) which states that "offerors and contractors 
are required (by 252.227-7013(j)) to notify the Government 
of any asserted restrictions on the Government's right to 
use or disclose technical data or computer software."  Prime 
contractors are required to include their subcontractor's 
technical data and computer software as well as their own. 
The respondents stated that it is common practice to include 
this notification in their proposal if the technical data 
are already in existence.  If the technical data are to be 
developed, the offeror may notify the Government at a later 
time as specification and requirements become more 
definitive. 
2.  Copyrights and Patents 
All of the companies who responded to the survey stated 
that they used patents or copyrights to protect at least 
some of their technical data. 
Copyrights were used most frequently because copyrights 
are easier to claim and easier to administer. Anyone can 
claim a copyright in an expression as it is fixed in the 
medium in which it is presented. An example of this concept 
is that as an author puts words on paper, he is afforded 
copyright protection on those words. The other major 
benefit that was mentioned most often was that a copyright 
is good for one hundred years if it is owned by a 
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corporation.  One major defense contractor for armored 
vehicles stated that a recent inter-corporation mandate from 
their legal department required copyright notices on all 
technical data. The reason was to make the person on the 
other end of the data transfer handle the information more 
carefully. This same contractor also stated that they knew 
that copyright law is not the most favored protection method 
since it only prevents copying. 
The majority of contractors stated that if the 
technical data are copyrighted, then they are more apt to 
seek licensing agreements where they may seek royalty fee 
payments for the useful life of the data. 
Patents were mentioned by fewer corporation 
representatives as a method for protecting technical data. 
Stated advantages were that patents are very effective in 
that most people understand the protection afforded them 
under patent law.  Since a patent is a seventeen-year 
exclusive right to a particular process or idea, it is a 
highly sought after method of protection.  The stated 
disadvantages are that it takes more time and money to 
obtain a patent.  Since much of the intellectual property is 
time critical, many of the contractors felt they could not 
take inordinate amounts of time to get patent protection 
unless a painstaking cost-benefit analysis was done. 
One former Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) brought 
up an important item to remember concerning patented and 
copyrighted material: the Government can use this 
information under the guidance of 28 U.S.C. 1498 (a) and 
(b).  This law allows the Government to use an 
"Authorization and Consent Clause" which permits copyrighted 
works or patented ideas to be used for Government purposes. 
This clause includes the right for a third party to use 
copyrighted works or patented ideas when performing work on 
behalf of the Government.  The data developer may seek 
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compensation from the Government but the courts will not 
allow injunctive relief. 
According to responding contractors, the method that 
affords the contractor/offeror the best protection is 
treating the technical data or intellectual property as a 
"trade secret." Trade secrets are ideas, information, or 
procedures that are kept secret and that give the firm or 
individual an advantage over another firm or individual in 
the marketplace. A trade secret can be licensed to the 
Government (or any other contracted party) for a particular 
purpose in return for a licensing fee but must be kept 
secret from outside activities.  The Authorization and 
Consent Clause is worded so that it only regulates 
copyrighted and patented information, not trade secrets. 
[Ref.15, p.233]  The Federal Trade Secret Act (18 U.S.C. 
1950) prevents a Government employee from wrongfully 
disclosing the trade secret to a third party.  Therefore, 
copyrighted works or patented ideas are not necessarily 
afforded the same protection as are trade secrets. [Ref.15, 
p.236] 
The representatives for the contractors stated that the 
important thing about using trade secret protection is to 
treat the information as a trade secret through policies 
such as employee training, restrictive viewing, and secure 
storage of the data. 
F.  GOVERNMENT TECHNICAL DATA ACQUISITION 
According to the views of the Government procurement 
agencies expressed in the survey responses, there are five 
major reasons that the Government seeks to acquire technical 
data: 1) to establish alternative manufacturing sources, 2) 
to ensure that there will be a source for the goods or 
services if the original source is unable to meet the 
delivery requirements (e.g., the source having a labor 
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strike or by simply going out of business), 3) emergency 
repairs and overhaul requirements, 4) the need for 
maintaining competition for the product or service through 
the Competition In Contracting Act (CICA), or 5) the support 
and maintenance requirements of the systems. 
The last reason is stated as being increasingly 
important due to the fact that more major weapon systems are 
being called upon to have a longer useful life. There is an 
increased emphasis on having a sound maintenance and support 
system for the entire life cycle of the system. 
In accordance with DFARS 227.402-70 (c), the Government 
must balance the contractor's interests in data ownership 
with the Government's need to use the data. Additionally, 
DFARS 222.402-71 states that the Government should minimize 
the amount of data obtained. Most of the contractors, 
however, clearly indicated that they believed the Government 
requested too much technical data and sought ownership when 
unwarranted. 
The Government representative responses voiced a 
similar opinion.  Two former PCOs who worked for a major 
military systems command stated that the presiding factor 
for their requests for technical data was to cover possible 
contingencies if and when they would be asked about the 
technical data package included in the procurement. 
However, a supervisor for the CALS function at a defense 
contracting firm voiced the opinion that while the 
Government may need the information that is eventually 
accessed  during the procurement and life of the system, it 
needs neither the information that is owned  by the company 
nor the quantities requested. 
Another major factor that is expressed by the 
Government is the cost of the technical data.  According to 
the Government and industry responses, both feel that cost 
is a minor factor when looking at technical data which the 
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Government feels is needed for the system. 
The concept of "over and above" is the method by which 
the PCOs stated that technical data are usually priced. 
This methodology has a price that is estimated based on the 
cost to the seller plus price parameters over and above the 
cost incurred if the data were not required at all [Ref.16]. 
These responders stated that they used this concept because 
there is inherent technical data generated. An associated 
cost for this technical data is generated as well.  Examples 
of these types of data would be engineering drawings and 
testing procedures. 
The responses generated from the contract 
administrators show opinions from the post-award aspect of 
the procurement.  The majority of these administrators 
stated that they felt that PCOs used the "cookie cutter" 
approach when acquiring technical data.  They felt that too 
much reliance was being placed upon the opinion of the 
technical experts who comprise the configuration boards and 
Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) personnel without 
adequate queries or validation. They felt that PCOs need to 
be more knowledgeable about technical data and technical 
data rights issues. 
6.  CALS AND TECHNICAL DATA RIGHTS 
There were several issues concerning the impact that 
CALS has on technical data and technical data rights 
identified by survey responses.  The survey specifically 
sought out information on the Contractor Integrated 
Technical Information Service (CITIS), the Government 
Concept of Operations (GCO), and the CALS Implementation 
Plan (CALSIP).  Additionally, technical data management and 
standards, data security issues, and the incentives and 
benefits of CALS were discussed. 
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1.  CITIS 
The Contractor Integrated Technical Information Service 
(CITIS) is a contracted line item that is designed to 
provide a single entry point for authorized Government 
access to and delivery for contractor data in response to 
valid CDRL requirements. [Ref.17, p.17] 
According to several survey responses, one of the major 
problems in the CITIS field is that there has been no cost 
analysis conducted and no apparent efficient cost control 
method established.  According to a CALS supervisor at a 
major telecommunications contractor, the Government 
negotiates technical data funds for each program, not on an 
aggregate basis for the contractor. Therefore, the 
contractor can charge the Government several times for 
access to the same data. The same source stated that it is 
believed that these overcharges can be minimized if and when 
the JCALS infrastructure is in place.  In this case, CITIS 
will be a part of the IWSDB and connected to the JCALS 
Global Distributed Data Management (GDDM) function [Ref.3, 
p.24]. 
Another CITIS problem is the funding required to 
implement the service.  Only one of the contractors 
surveyed, who is a major CALS operator, had received level- 
of-effort funding from the Government for the establishment 
of the CITIS.  One Government representative from a major 
systems command and a representative from the CALS Steering 
Group stated that without Government funding, small 
businesses are at a great disadvantage to larger firms 
because they would not have the resources available to 
purchase CALS equipment and to hire adequate personnel. A 
representative from the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
CALS Executive stated that it is not the intent of CALS to 
put small businesses at any disadvantage, and that small 
business status would be considered when the issue of 
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Government funding took place during contract negotiations. 
A respondent from the CALS Industry Steering Group stated 
that the reason for inadequate CITIS funding is that it is 
never seen as a Contract Line Item Number (CLIN);  it is 
usually an "add-on" for a procurement only if the 
operational and performance requirements desired by the 
hardware systems commands are met. 
Of the contractors surveyed, all stated that they were 
using, or were planning to use their own version of CITIS. 
One of the major CITIS issues is the compatibility required 
of an access/delivery system of this magnitude.  One hundred 
percent of the companies surveyed stated that while they are 
knowledgeable that CALS demands compatibility and 
standardization of information across the board, they are 
focused on being compatible and standardized only within 
their own organizations.  To paraphrase the words of several 
of the company responders, their companies are "...just now 
getting to the point of computer standardization; we can't 
worry about what everyone else is doing...". 
2.  GCO 
As explained earlier in this thesis, the Government 
Concept of Operations (GCO) is to provide information to the 
contractors about the Government's strategy for CALS 
implementation.  It also is to ensure that the Government 
receives the correct version and formats of digitized data 
products. [Ref.18, p.10] 
Most of the contractors responded that they had not yet 
seen a GCO in a solicitation.  Two of the responders stated 
that they thought this was due to the Government not knowing 
what their strategy for CALS is.  Three other contractors 
responded that they believed CALS was still in its early 
stages and thought the Government was allowing contractors 
to come up with their own implementation strategy. 
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3. CALSIP 
While CITIS and GCO are generally provided from the 
Government to the contractor, the CALS Implementation Plan 
(CALSIP) is from the contractor to the Government.  Its 
purpose is to provide an indication of the contractor's plan 
to implement CALS and in what magnitude, which serves as an 
indication to the Government of that company's commitment to 
CALS. [Ref.18, p.20] 
All of the company and Government representatives 
agreed that the CALSIP is a key to getting CALS used in a 
wider context of jobs, and to increase contractor motivation 
to use CALS. However, only one company representative 
stated that a CALSIP was used.  Of those who stated that the 
CALSIP wasn't used, the majority felt it was a Government 
requirement for another piece of paper that wasn't high 
enough on anyone's priority list to monitor and ensure 
compliance.  The Government representatives stated that the 
CALSIP was viewed as being more important as the CALS 
concept grew--it wasn't really important in this phase of 
CALS. 
4. Technical Data Management and Standards 
a. Technical Data Management 
From the survey responses of the program managers 
it is evident that guidance from the Government concerning a 
consolidated policy on digital data requirements and 
standardized technical data management is lacking.  The 
program managers stated that they were confused by the 
wording  in both DOD Directive 5000.1 (DODD 5000.1), 
"Defense Acquisition" and DOD Instruction 5000.2 (DODI 
5000.2), "Defense Acquisition Management Policies and 
Procedures."  These are two of the three primary DOD 
documents concerned with digital data management.  The other 
publication is Military Handbook (MIL-HDBK) 59A, Department 
of Defense Computer-aided Acquisition and Logistics Support 
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(CALS) Program Implementation Guide." The program managers 
stated that they weren't sure when they were supposed to use 
digital data during weapon system acquisition. According to 
DODI 5000.2, digitized technical data are required unless 
there is a "convincing analysis" involving cost, schedule, 
and risk that justifies another course of action.  [Ref.12, 
p„9-B-2]  The program managers stated that because each 
Service has separate infrastructures for accepting digital 
data, it is relatively simple to produce a "convincing 
analysis" that shows CALS not to be an effective resource. 
The instruction does not direct DOD activities to contract 
for digital data, it merely suggests courses of action. 
[Ref.12, p.9-B-2] 
Another document mentioned by one respondent is the 
CALS Architecture Study.   [Ref.2]  The respondent used the 
study in implementing the CALS initiative.  The respondent 
was quite pleased with the way in which the study provided 
information about converting manual processes into the 
automated IWDSB but stated that it lacked specific methods 
in which to standardize and protect technical data and 
intellectual property. 
These same program managers voiced an opinion that CALS 
requirements were not standardized in contract language. 
They believed that in a high-technology area such as CALS, 
it is vital that contracts contain clear, specific language 
that thoroughly and accurately describes the digital data 
requirements of a procurement action. 
Jb. Technical Data Standards 
A major aspect of CALS is the standardization of 
technical data entry and access.  Commonality of data 
enables fast and efficient data exchange between DOD and 
industry. [Ref.17, p.l]  However, according to a 
representative from the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) CALS Executive, there have been delays in the 
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development of digital data standards.  Most of these delays 
were thought to be because there is a continuing discussion 
as to who is responsible for developing the standards. 
Another of the main contributing reasons for delay is 
the use of optional standards. Military Specification 
28002A specifies the use of raster graphics. Raster 
graphics is a method of storing graphics information such as 
technical drawings and blueprints [Ref.18, p.56].  This 
specification allows choices between and within two choices 
of data: tiled and untiled.  According to the DOD Inspector 
General report, "Management of Digitized Technical Data", 
the use of these options results not only in increased 
flexibility but in increased costs as well.  When these 
options are used, the information systems end up paying for 
two types of data to ensure system compatibility.  The 
Army's Digital Storage and Retrieval Engineering Data System 
(DSREDS) is an example.  [Ref.3, p.65] 
5.  Technical Data Security 
According to the respondents, CALS is designed to 
prevent unauthorized access to technical data and 
proprietary property.  Since CITIS is the data access and 
delivery method, it is the prime tool used for guarding 
access to this information. [Ref.17, p.2] 
The respondents to the survey stated that since CITIS 
was generally developed by each contractor's shared 
database, security measures that are in place are not 
trusted nor are compatible with other company's measures. 
Survey responses indicate that the security measures 
utilized by the Army's JAVELIN program, the Air Force's B-2 
program, and the Navy's AEGIS program are totally different 
and inconsistent with each other.  Therefore, Program 
Managers have to deal with a wide diversity of security 
requirements. 
In the words of a major armored vehicle defense 
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contractor, "A shared database is a frightening thing to a 
contractor." The contractors simply do not trust a 
Government-operated system that appears not to have any type 
of guidance or structure for technical data security from 
top-level Government management. They demand protection for 
their intellectual property and technical data and do not 
want their competition possibly to gain access to it. 
The same contractor said that CALS is soon to be used 
on their major armored vehicle program. This change is not 
due to the contractor becoming aware of the benefits of CALS 
or CALS improvements, but only because the vehicle program 
is mature enough to face the risk of technical data 
disclosure.  They go on further to state that if they were 
to develop a high-tech, complex vehicle or other item, they 
would not implement CALS for the program voluntarily because 
they fear possible disclosure of their technical data. 
6.  Incentives and Benefits 
The responses of the program managers and the 
contracting officers show that there is no evident incentive 
for them to use CALS in a procurement action.  None of the 
responses indicate any evidence of CALS training or 
promotion within programs they had experience with. 
One of the reasons for this dilemma is that there are 
no established standards that have been enforced for CALS. 
Without these standards procurement officials are hesitant 
to commit to the CALS system. 
Another reason is that CALS ends up costing more than 
manual systems.  Often, hard copy technical data are 
requested in addition to digitized data because of the lack 
of a standardized access and due to the fact that a 
significant number of procurement personnel do not trust 
digital data. This mistrust is associated both with the 
lack of standards and the archaic attitudes against computer 
use. 
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The respondents from both the Government and industry 
stated that there is no current method in which to measure 
the value (benefits) of the CALS system.  For the 
Government, there is no single budget line-item for CALS. 
Appropriated funds that were originally programmed for hard 
copy technical data are used to fund CALS digital data. 
H.  SUMMARY 
The dichotomy that exists between the Government and 
industry is manifested in the data presented in this 
chapter. Both the Government and industry realizes that 
technical data and intellectual property are extremely 
valuable and necessary for both parties to conduct business. 
However, the two entities' approaches are quite different. 
The Government is mandated by DFARS 227.402-70 
(c)(1)(2) to conduct a balancing act that allows the 
Government to acquire technical data to stimulate 
competition and to lower costs while allowing industry to 
hold technical data close that provides them with product or 
service differentiation and an edge in competition.  This 
alone recognizes that there are two schools of thought on 
the economic interests for technical data. 
CALS itself presents an interesting conflict in that 
its design is to provide access of standardized data to a 
wide user base.  However, security and unauthorized 
disclosure are two of the biggest concerns with CALS that 
are voiced by the survey respondents. 
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IV.  DATA ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As presented in Chapter III, there were seven topical 
issues uncovered by the survey.  In this chapter, those same 
topical areas will serve as the structure for presenting the 
analysis of those data. Additionally, there will be a 
discussion of the proposed FAR and DFARS regulations 
followed by an interpretation of how the proposed changes 
will affect a CALS environment.  A summary that will draw 
together the highlights of this section will follow. 
B. RESTRICTIONS AND ORIGINS OF TECHNICAL DATA 
Consideration for technical data and technical data 
rights is done during the "data call." Here, experts from 
the various functional fields determine what technical data 
are required for a particular procurement and what rights 
restrictions are sought. [Ref.11, p.7] 
A major problem with this procedure is that the 
functional experts are usually separated from the 
contracting and business personnel. This can be seen as 
separation by different offices, different areas of the same 
building, or different buildings altogether. People on both 
sides are not familiar with how the other side operates or 
thinks. [Ref.7]  Another problem that can be associated with 
the problem described above is that the functional expert's 
opinion is seldom challenged [Ref.7].  It is associated with 
the above problem in that if the contracting personnel don't 
know exactly what thought processes, need assessments, or 
performance analyses went into the expert's decisions, they 
will challenge the requirement much less than if they knew 
of these intricacies.  Conversely, if the functional experts 
were made more aware of the different contracting methods 
the Government may utilize to gain access to technical data 
without owning the data, they might be able to request only 
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the needed technical data for the procurement and the 
appropriate rights restrictions. 
Too many times, the functional expert's performance is 
judged upon the amount of technical data that they require 
or have sitting on their desk.  The supervisors in each of 
the areas are not monitoring (and reducing) the amounts or 
types of technical information that is being requested 
before it has a chance to get to the contracting personnel. 
[Ref.7,16]  Once the foundation has been established by the 
functional experts on what technical data they believe are 
needed, the solicitation is used to describe exactly what 
the contractor is to provide to the Government.  Too many 
times the solicitation is used as a "wish list" for 
technical data instead of what data are actually required to 
perform the procurement.  Consequently, this results in 
additional time and money committed to the acquisition 
process by the contractor and the Government.  The 
contractor must analyze and evaluate the technical data 
requirements before they can properly submit their proposal. 
The Government must invest more money for the contract, more 
time in the development of the solicitation itself and later 
in the procurement process when technical data 
administration costs materialize, and in the time and money 
invested in additional DOD auditor tasking to evaluate the 
contractor's cost estimating system. 
Since the Government is required by DFARS 227.402-70 
(c) to balance its needs for technical data against the 
protection of data rights for the contractor, a proper 
assessment of technical data requirements must be conducted 
prior to issuing the Request For Proposal (RFP). 
[Ref.7,9,10]  In order to maximize the impact, the 
assessment needs to be accomplished before the engineering 
and manufacturing development phase (phase II of the major 
weapon acquisition process) begins. 
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There seems to be a lack of training in the area of 
technical rights restrictions. The functional experts who 
originate the restrictions know little about the licensing 
methods available through the FAR and DFARS, such as 
Government Purpose License Rights, and the difference 
between restrictions sought in a commercial application 
versus those sought in a Government application. 
[Ref.10,16] 
C.  SHARED DATABASE IN THE MARKETPLACE 
In this area, the biggest question is why will/why 
won't industry enter into a shared database with the 
Government.   Businesses are moving away from the 
Government marketplace and toward the commercial marketplace 
[Ref.19].  The reasons for this movement are varied.  The 
downsizing of DOD and the tightening of the DOD weapon 
system procurement budget certainly are general factors. 
[Ref.9]  As far as technical data, industry is moving away 
from the Government for a variety of other reasons. 
Industry believes that the Government seeks access and 
ownership of too much technical data.  Detailed technical 
data can give a company a particular niche in the market. 
If the company enters into business with the Government, the 
company usually fears that the Government may disclose the 
information to a competing firm. [Ref.7,8,9] 
Industry doesn't want to venture into a Government 
shared data base system where they fear a lack of control 
over their technical data. [Ref.10]  While some of this fear 
is well-founded, some of it is not. An example would be 
that while CITIS is a data access system only for CDRL data 
[Ref.17, p.l], many industry personnel who responded to the 
survey believe that providing proprietary property to an 
access system that has many users is not a good business 
practice. 
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Industry favors working in an environment which allows 
less regulation over technical data rights [Ref.9]. Several 
industries are familiar and quite comfortable with less 
formal agreements or teaming arrangements that would be 
virtually impossible to conduct with the Government in a 
shared data base setting. 
When discussing the possibility of entering into a 
shared data base system with the Government, industry seems 
to be well acquainted with the Government's history in 
computer systems.  CALS itself was initiated in a segmented, 
fragmented, decentralized manner in 1985 [Ref.20] and much 
of industry feels that it hasn't changed significantly. 
Non-standardization of data access and security along with 
system incompatibility within Government activities and 
between the Government and industry are seen as major 
obstacles in the full implementation of the CALS initiative. 
In a period of more than eight years, the Government has 
spent over $5.2 million on the CALS system, which will need 
modifications in areas such as accessibility and security, 
[Ref.3, p.82] before it is to achieve major acceptance. 
D.  PROTECTIVE ACTIONS 
As structured in Chapter III, this section lends itself 
to being discussed in a convenient manner by first looking 
at the regulations delineated in the FAR and DFARS.  An 
analysis of copyright, patent, and trade secret protective 
actions will follow to allow the reader to gain a concise 
picture of a wide-ranging set of issues. 
1.  FAR and DFARS Clauses 
Industry is very concerned over the wording in the FAR 
and DFARS clauses for technical data rights.  In DFARS 
252.227-7013 (a) (11) , "Rights in Technical Data and 
Computer Software," the clause states that "any cost of 
development that was paid for in whole by the Government or 
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that the development was required for the performance of a 
Government contract or subcontract"   (italics added for 
emphasis) is subject to unlimited data rights for the 
Government. This can be interpreted too broadly. DOD's 
interpretation potentially covers any data that a contractor 
might use in the development of a weapon system under 
contract, even if the contractor doesn't charge the 
Government the development cost. Thus, contractors are 
hesitant to use a new process or item in a procurement 
action due to the additional risks faced by the Government 
claiming unlimited rights. This leads to the contractor 
holding new, improved processes or items for commercial 
applications since they can possess more data rights in that 
marketplace. 
It is the general opinion of both the Government and 
industry that funding source is the best known method by 
which to assign ownership. [Ref.4, p.42]  While this 
situation is more easily decided when the funding is 
exclusively from one party, the issue becomes muddled when 
mixed funding has occurred.  There seems to be a failure on 
both sides to examine the situation to determine the 
applicability of alternative rights restrictions such as 
GPLR.  The Government's fear of losing complete control of 
the technical data rights remains to be that they may need 
the data someday for competition or if the original 
equipment manufacturer goes out of business.  [Ref.19] 
According to DFARS 252.227-7037, restrictive markings 
on a firm's proprietary property remains a mandatory action. 
In the recent past, the Government did not fully comply with 
these markings and at times ignored them altogether. Today, 
the Government does not challenge the proprietary markings 
enough.  The contracting officer checking these markings is 
aware of the legal backlash and the time delays that they 
could possibly face in the event they suspect that the 
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nature of the data does not match the associated restrictive 
marking.  Therefore, it's simply not worth the time and 
expense to challenge. The companies have recognized this 
shift and have begun to liberally interpret their own 
restrictions and definitions to mark their data in a more 
protective manner. [Ref.7]  Most of the companies 
interviewed not only marked their data in the manner 
delegated by DFARS 252.227-7013, but they also marked it in 
accordance with their own internal restriction labels as 
well.  [Ref.8,10]  It seems that industry is well acquainted 
with the FAR and DFARS clauses and have found a way in which 
to make them work in their favor. 
2.  Copyrights, Patents, and Trade Secrets 
Associated with industry's liberal use of restrictive 
markings is the use of copyrights.  In accordance with 
copyright law, anyone can copyright work that they create. 
In response to their own fear that the Government will seek 
unlimited rights in technical data, industry has begun to 
copyright extreme amounts and types of data. As discussed 
in Chapter III, one company had their legal department issue 
a mandate for affixing a copyright notice to all technical 
data associated with a Government contract.  Conversely, the 
Government knows that copyright law is very difficult to 
interpret and to prosecute against. [Ref.14] 
Patent protection seems to be more effective for 
technical data rights.  However, there is more time and 
money needed to be spent to get patent protection than 
copyright protection.  Industry seems to use patent 
protection only for property it deems as most valuable. 
[Ref.14] 
The Government may still use copyrighted or patented 
data through the "Authorization and Consent Clause" of the 
contract.  It is believed that the Government would resort 
to this clause only if absolutely necessary due to the 
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compensation required. 
E.  GOVERNMENTAL TECHNICAL DATA ACQUISITION 
There seems to be two groups of reasons for the 
Government acquisition of technical data: the "official»1 
reasons and the "unofficial" reasons. 
The "official" reasons are stated in DFARS 252.227-7013 
(a)(15)(i): 1) establishing alternative manufacturing 
sources; 2) ensuring there will be a source if the original 
source is unable to meet the delivery requirements; and 3) 
emergency repairs and overhaul requirements. Although each 
of these reasons might come into play at some time in the 
future, the possibilities seem to be remote. Because of the 
current industrial base volatility, the second stated reason 
may be faced if the supplier(s) go out of business or remove 
themselves from Government contracting.  The inability to 
meet delivery schedules may also be the scenario faced if 
the Government chose to modify the original contract for the 
procurement of additional items after the company has 
completed its production run.  This situation is very costly 
to the Government and has the chance of being very 
profitable for the company.  It is not really clear why the 
Government seeks alternative sourcing.  It seems that the 
real reason is to get the lowest possible price.  In these 
times of no real specific national threat, the emphasis is 
on cost control.  If the sponsor of a particular weapon 
system can't get the system under budget, he or she is 
forced into making the decision of either modifying the 
system, convincing the fund providers (the Defense Planning 
Resources Board for weapon systems) that the system is 
actually needed, or scrap the system completely. [Ref.11, 
p.6]  However, the real focus in pricing should not be on 
obtaining the lowest possible price, but in obtaining a 
"fair and reasonable price." The concept of a "fair and 
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reasonable price" describes a conclusion that the price is 
acceptable to both the Government and the seller. 
Consideration of factors such as maintenance and delivery 
costs along with price must be made before this agreement is 
reached. [Ref.23, p.2-7] 
The "unofficial" reasons for Governmental acquisition 
of technical data seem to be: 1) to cover the Competition in 
Contracting Act (CICA) requirements; 2) to cover any- 
possible requirement for technical data that may surface 
during the life of the system; 3) to verify the different 
contractor processes used during the contract; 4) to cover 
maintenance and support requirements for older systems; and 
5) cost. 
Although it may seem peculiar to classify CICA 
requirements as an "unofficial" reason, many of the 
Government contracting officers interviewed stated that CICA 
was not an "official" reason.  However, it seems doubtful 
that a regulation with such a wide spread coverage as CICA 
would not be a major factor.  Contracting officers and their 
procurement activities are subjected to periodic reviews 
such as Procurement Management Reviews (PMRs) and Contract 
Management Reviews which look at the procedures used during 
the awarding of a contract to determine whether the field 
activities are supporting Government policies [Ref.22, 
p.179] such as CICA.  If the contracting officer hasn't 
established the "full and open competition" requirement of 
CICA, the review grades and the contracting officer's career 
are likely to suffer. 
The need to acquire technical data for the present and 
future requirements of the weapon systems is partially due 
to actual envisioned needs, and to some degree needs that 
usually never materialize. [Ref.7]  It seems that a 
significant portion of the technical data acquired are 
excessive.  The procuring contracting officers interviewed 
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stated that this practice was due to the need to look like 
they were covering all possible system changes, and because 
the amount of technical data they ordered was the same 
amount that was always ordered.  It appears that contracting 
officers face possible severe pressures for the seldom- 
occurring situation of the system requiring technical data 
in the future that wasn't ordered in the present. No one 
wants to be the person responsible for such an occurrence 
even if it means that the Government pays more money than it 
should for the majority of situations.  A lack of 
understanding the intricacies of technical data rights and a 
lack of effective acquisition planning are leading 
candidates for causing this dilemma. [Ref.7,16] 
The Government needs technical data to verify the 
contractor's processes employed during the life of the 
contract.  Technical data are used to analyze virtually all 
aspects of business; development, production, manufacturing, 
and accounting are just a few specific areas of Governmental 
interests.  The real question becomes: "Does this need 
require ownership  of the technical data or access"? 
Historically, the Government has succinctly answered, 
"Ownership!" [Ref.6,9,10]  The Government has been in the 
position for quite some time of being able to buy the 
ownership rights to all the technical data it wanted. This 
allowed the Government to maintain control over 
technological advancements made in defense systems, to 
assure itself of maintaining an industrial base, and having 
several competitors to guarantee the lowest prices for these 
formidable systems.  Can the Government continue to do this? 
By all indications, it appears not.  Another reason for data 
ownership appears to be a lack of training of procurement 
personnel concerning the alternative methods of gaining 
access to technical data.  There were no respondents to the 
survey who knew of any training held for procurement 
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personnel concerning technical data and technical data 
rights. Technical data requirements are generally- 
formulated during the development acquisition phase when 
there are still many uncertainties existing [Ref.4, p.3]. 
Although this method can provide quicker budget estimates 
for technical data, it also demands careful, farsighted 
planning that is periodically less than fully realized. 
Planning that concerns the status of the equipment 
manufactures, alternative sources, system life cycle, 
maintenance and supportability, and threat posture all must 
be considered in order to determine the correct amount and 
types of technical data to require either access or 
ownership. Too often, technical data requirements are 
realized in the later production phase. An adequate 
assessment of technical data requirements must be conducted 
prior to the engineering and manufacturing phase of weapon 
system acquisition. When the contractor has already 
proceeded to provide hardware for the contract, additional 
data requirements will invariably cost the Government 
inordinate amounts of money. 
As the budget for weapon systems continues to decrease, 
there is a corresponding increase in the life expectancy 
requirement of the weapon systems and an increased demand 
for additional maintenance and support funding for the older 
systems. Along with this situation is the desire that more 
of this support and maintenance be accomplished by outside 
contractors because of the downsizing in military personnel 
and the decrease in training funds. All of these factors 
combined seem to indicate an increase for technical data in 
the maintenance and support areas.  This increase calls for 
even greater focus on coordinated planning for the shrinking 
data dollar. 
There are two major cost elements involved with 
technical data: 1) development and preparation costs 
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involving labor, research and development, design, etc., and 
2) production costs involving mostly material and processing 
costs. These are usually treated as indirect costs. [Ref.6] 
Although these elements have been identified, the Government 
seems to ignore the interacting effects of all these 
elements.  It is estimated that 30% of the total contract 
cost is spent on technical data administration functions for 
data required by the Government. [Ref.7]  The overwhelming 
governing factor seems to be the need for the data, not its 
cost.  There appears to be no existing governing research 
conducted on the differing cost elements and how they affect 
the cost of technical data. [Ref.25, p.13]  While individual 
Government price analysts are able to identify some of the 
cost elements, there is no Government-wide research that 
identifies all  the cost elements and how they affect 
technical data cost. 
One problem with the Government's practice of procuring 
technical data is that they use the solicitation as a "wish 
list" for the data they would like to acquire instead of for 
what is actually needed.  This request for excessive data 
adds a great deal of time and money to the procurement 
process due to the required involvement of DOD auditors and 
the evaluation of the contractor's cost estimating system. 
[Ref.23] 
The timing of technical data funding is also an area of 
concern.  Often, the Government will seek funds too early in 
the acquisition process while not being fully knowledgeable 
about the technical data requirements.  If the data 
requirements are amended to include additional data items, 
the amount of funding is insufficient and results in a 
disproportionate increase in funds. [Ref.7,19] 
As of now, there has been no long-term cost-benefit 
analysis conducted to support major investments made in the 
area of CALS or similar shared database computing systems. 
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[Ref.4, p.85]  Normally, a long-term cost-benefit analysis 
provides an adequate level of support to the acquisition 
manager's decision-making process. Because CALS has been a 
"push-demand" item (mandated from the top-down), it has been 
developed without total regard towards whether industry or 
the Government can live with it or without it. 
F.  CALS AND TECHNICAL DATA RIGHTS 
MIL-STD-974, Contractor Integrated Technical 
Information Service (CITIS) calls out Contract Data 
Requirements List (CDRL) items to be included in the CALS 
shared database [Ref.17, p.5]. However, all of the defense 
contractors surveyed indicated that they were most afraid of 
the loss of control over their proprietary data. These 
proprietary data would not be on the CDRL, and therefore 
would not be subject to disclosure.  When asked about this, 
half the contractors stated they weren't aware of that 
particular statement and half stated that although they had 
seen the statement, they weren't sure that the Government 
would adhere to it. 
The scenario of recompetition is becoming more likely 
in this era of industrial base reformation.  In this 
situation, a weapon system contract migrates from a sole 
source to a competitive procurement.  The question of what 
happens to the technical data and who maintains what data 
rights is a resulting unknown.  Typically, a "bidder's 
library" is constructed by the incumbent contractor.  This 
library usually only contains form, fit, and function 
technical data.  These types of data are not the sensitive, 
proprietary data that most of the contractors are worried 
about. These form, fit, and function data are just enough 
to provide the possible alternative sources with a system 
description. [Ref.16]  Although many of the interviewed 
contractors see this as a problem in a CALS system, it is 
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believed that they are once again forgetting that the 
technical data involved in the accessible database are CDRL 
data, not proprietary, and therefore not a problem unless 
the Government decides to seek additional data.  If the 
scenario should play itself out to where the possible 
alternative contractor needs more that the form, fit, and 
function data, the incumbent contractor could establish a 
licensing arrangement, if the data are protected by either a 
copyright or a patent, or could engage in negotiations for 
the data if not copyright or patent protected. 
An evident weakness in the current status of CITIS is 
that the JCALS ability to connect data bases with other CALS 
systems has not yet been implemented.  Since this 
connectivity ability only pertains to CALS systems, the Army 
has directed that cost effectiveness be proven. The JCALS 
connectivity, when implemented, would serve as the single 
entry point for access to contractor data, thus 
significantly reducing costs.  [Ref.4, p.34] 
The GCO and CALSIP have been instituted but not one of 
the respondents have used them in assisting them in CALS 
implementation.  These documents are tools that contractors 
and the Government should be using to provide information as 
to the Government's plans for CALS and the contractor's 
plans for CALS.  These documents may provide some of the 
very information that is lacking. 
G.  PROPOSED REGULATION CHANGES 
The proposed changes to technical data rights 
guidelines have a far-reaching effect and could change the 
manner in which Government does business with industry in 
the future. 
As presented in Chapter II of this thesis, there are 
six major areas which are of major concern in this study. 
These six areas will be analyzed in this section. 
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1.  Allocating Data Rights 
In looking first at the Government's position, the 
question of "What would be a better method to allocate data 
rights than funding contribution?" comes to mind.  Ownership 
and the rights associated with ownership of property have 
historically been bestowed upon whomever pays to own those 
rights. This is a fundamental aspect we have embedded in our 
own capitalistic system.  If the funding party then chooses 
not to own the rights to that property, then the rights and 
property can be given to another party in a legal 
transaction.  This transaction can be selling the rights of 
ownership or simply giving the rights away.  Since technical 
data rights and intellectual property are usually considered 
too valuable to give away, it should follow that they be 
sold. Therefore, the Government's position to maintain the 
funding method of allocation seems to be adequate. 
The OEMs' position seems to take the Government's 
position one step further.  The possibility of legal 
problems and procurement delays are major concerns with this 
position because whenever the Government feels that they 
have contributed more funds, it would be the Government who 
would have to conduct the unilateral contracting action of 
changing the data rights restrictions.  Unilateral actions 
are highly susceptible to future legal squabbles. [Ref.11, 
p.15] There would be several questions that would need to 
constantly be answered, such as: "How much increase in 
funding calls for an increase in rights restrictions?," 
"Are the limited rights specifically for protecting data 
from possible disclosure to commercial companies or would it 
be for Government purposes?".  This position virtually 
guarantees the OEMs with 100% ownership of all technical 
data unless there is unilateral action on behalf of the 
Government. 
The Government-Industry Technical Data Committee 
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appears to have adopted the underlying principle that data 
ownership should go to the party who funds its development. 
However, these non-developers are not following this 
principle when they propose that the Government take data 
rights it has not paid for. The non-developers view the 
OEMs' opinion as taking away the possibility of being able 
to use the OEMs' technical data for such actions as direct 
foreign military sales and spare parts sales. They are 
fearful that if the OEMs are subjected to less rights 
restrictions, they will be put out of business.  Again, the 
point is that property ownership and control should go to 
the party who pays for it„ 
A significant number of these non-developers are small 
businesses.  The Government has several regulations and 
policies regarding the protection of these small businesses. 
As suggested by the Chair of the Government-Industry 
Technical Data Committee, expansion of the regulations could 
be made to assist these small businesses. [Ref.4, p.13] 
Examples would be having the contracting officer assist the 
small businesses in obtaining manufacturing process data in 
order to produce repair parts, and having shorter GPLR 
periods to allow non-developers data access that is required 
for spare parts manufacture.  These suggestions appear to 
assist the small business non-developers without equal 
consideration given to the OEMs.  What is being sacrificed 
by the non-developers?  It appears that the topic of 
adequate compensation has not been addressed. 
2.  Defining "Developed Data" 
The question of determining when the technical data are 
developed is important in determining the rightful owner of 
the technical data rights. The point at which the data are 
found to be developed is the point at which funding for the 
data is determined.  Since funding is the current method 
used to determine data rights allocation, development 
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determination points actually result in data rights 
allocations. 
The focal points of this proposed change are the 
"existence" and "workability" concepts. The "existence" 
concept states that an item exists if it has been practiced. 
That is, the idea has been applied to a situation similar to 
the actual event. The "workability" concept states that 
there is a high probability of the item operating as 
intended. [Ref.4, p.7]  Do these concepts make sense for 
technical data and intellectual property? 
CAD and other types of computer simulation can give 
estimated probabilities of workability, and these estimates 
are getting closer and closer to actual probabilities found 
in non-computerized testing.  These computer simulations 
will also reduce overall costs of technical data because 
there is no need to have the actual item or process; all 
that is required is the computer simulated item or process. 
[Ref.6,16] It is felt that these simulations are  as good as 
the real thing in certain circumstances but may not be in 
other situations due to the relatively immature nature of 
computer simulation in Government procurement.  The 
attitudes that accompany CALS implementation and use also 
accompany computer simulation- its advocates will have to 
develop environments that will support computer methods. 
Computer simulation supporters must also remember that the 
Government spends too much money on technical data to rely 
on simulated images that may or may not be reliable.  CAD 
and computer simulations will undoubtedly have a place in 
Government procurement, but only after they have been proven 
and practiced over a wide range of items and processes. 
Intellectual property exists merely as an idea; what is 
actually of value to the Government and industry is the 
idea,  while the technical data merely represent that idea 
on some type of medium. It would be impractical for a 
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company to acquire an idea that hasn't been represented on 
some readable medium. Therefore, both concepts must be 
present and verified in order to have technical data that 
are of worth to the buyer or developer. 
3.  Expenses and Indirect Costs 
This argument actually explores two issues: the 
classification of data development private expense as 
indirect expense, and the "required for performance" 
criterion. 
First, industry wants to get as much data development 
expense possible to be classified as indirect cost because 
10 U.S.C. 2320 identifies indirect cost as private expense. 
Industry may then declare that the technical data are 
developed at private expense instead of Government expense 
and claim ownership rights to the data. 
In the above situation, the question arises about how 
manipulative a company may be in the classification of their 
expenses. Certain national defense contractors and 
subcontractors are required to comply with cost accounting 
standards, to disclose their cost accounting practices and 
procedures in writing, and to follow those disclosed 
practices and procedures consistently.  FAR, Part 30 
provides the guidelines used when deciding whether a 
proposed contract may require CAS coverage.  The contracting 
officer includes a notice to that effect in the 
solicitation. Usually, the contracting officer will not 
award the CAS-covered contract until the Administrative 
Contracting Officer (ACO) has determined that the statement 
of disclosure is adequate.  This disclosure provides an 
explanation and description of the contractor's or 
subcontractor's accounting system and how particular costs 
will be treated. [Ref.24, p.3-8] 
The Government representatives believe that the removal 
of the »required for performance» criterion would result in 
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technical data rights being driven by accounting practices 
and would allow the companies to selectively protect 
technical data by charging development costs as indirect 
expenses. 
The Armed Services Pricing Manual (ASPM) defines direct 
costs as "any cost that is specifically identified with a 
particular final cost objective" (FCO).  An FCO "is one to 
which both direct and indirect costs are allocated (e.g., a 
project or a contract)." An indirect cost is: 
any cost not directly identified with a single FCO.  It 
is identified with two or more FCOs or at least one 
intermediate cost objective later allocated to FCOs. 
[Ref.24, p.6-19,20] 
According to these definitions, it would appear to be 
quite difficult for companies to manipulate their 
expenditures as feared by the Government. Although there is 
a possibility for companies to charge "insignificant" direct 
costs as indirect costs, these insignificant amounts would 
probably not be associated with typically high-priced, high 
visibility technical data.  Contractors are already 
permitted to use their own accounting system as long as it 
is consistent, is in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles and practices appropriate to the 
particular circumstances, and results in an equitable 
distribution among the different products sold. [Ref.24, 
p.3-9]  Therefore, it appears that there are already 
adequate regulations and monitoring activities to ensure 
those regulations are enforced. The removal of the 
"required for performance" criterion would not have a long- 
reaching affect on the question of accounting procedures but 
would provide incentive to the companies to develop their 
best technical processes while under a Government contract. 
In the question of treating data development costs as 
indirect costs, it appears that the Government and the 
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company will have to derive a method of being able to 
understand and agree upon cost treatment procedures before 
the actual contract award. This will eliminate possible 
negotiation delays and legal entanglements and would help 
provide accounting system consistency for the Government to 
monitor. 
Once a viable cost treatment system is formulated, its 
impact will be to increase integration between the 
Government and commercial marketplaces. By defining all 
private costs as indirect costs, companies will no longer 
fear that their privately funded intellectual property and 
technical data will be taken over by the Government. 
4.  Mixed Funding Situations 
10 U.S.C. 2320 and DFARS 227.402-70 states that DOD is 
required to negotiate for technical data rights in 
situations of mixed funding.  The question for this issue 
thus becomes whether these guidelines should be used or 
should they be changed to allow for GPLR in mixed funding 
situations. 
In answering this question, the definition of mixed 
funding must be arrived at.  If the Government contributes 
only $1 for data development, is that mixed funding? Is a 
40%-60% Government-Industry contribution share appropriate? 
Why not go back to the old "50-50 rule"? While it is 
acknowledged that negotiating GPLR licenses for each 
procurement is time consuming, it is believed that both 
parties can be best represented where specific 
characteristics associated with the transaction can be 
addressed in one arena. 
In a GPLR situation, the Government can disclose, use, 
or release data for Government purposes. 
The term "Government purposes" is not clearly defined. 
DFARS 227.401 (14) provides only a cursory definition of 
Government purposes by stating that: 
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Government purposes include competitive procurement, 
but do not include the right to have or permit others to use 
technical data...for commercial purposes. 
With this type of a definition, a myriad of other 
transactions might qualify as "Government purpose" such as 
direct foreign sales and foreign spare parts sales. This 
type of an inclusion would greatly benefit the non- 
developers of technical data since these transactions are 
their focus.  The committee's recommendation for GPLR also 
includes the provision for a five-year period in which the 
data developer would have an exclusive right to 
commercialize the data.  After this time period, the 
Government would receive unlimited rights.  While this may 
take some of the burden off the Government in administering 
the GPLR rights, it will have an adverse effect on the 
commercialization of the item.  In the commercial 
marketplace, industry can seek to commercialize for an 
indefinite time period.  If the data rights opportunities 
are different when dealing with the Government, industry 
will seek the more appealing marketplace. 
5.  Commercial Items 
In these times of shrinking budgets and a shrinking 
industry base, an appropriate use of commercial items is one 
method used to reduce procurement costs and integrate the 
Government and industry markets.  It is a belief of many 
Government and industry representatives that more commercial 
products should be used to fulfill Government needs to lower 
costs and to broaden the competitive base. [Ref.9,14,14] 
This has been difficult to achieve since the executive 
agencies have vast numbers of people and facilities whose 
purpose is to provide detailed design specifications.  These 
design specifications effectively narrow down the item or 
process to a point where no commercial item or process will 
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meet the specification requirements. 
The technical data deliverables associated with 
commercial items or processes are usually different from 
those associated with new development items. Although the 
data are dependent upon the item or process, the technical 
data typically delivered for commercial items or processes 
include technical manuals or operator instructions. [Ref.25] 
Industry may also modify noncommercial items to make 
them have a commercial application. Humvees, and 747 jet 
aircraft are but two examples.  If the original item has 
associated technical data that were developed exclusively at 
Government expense, the Government has unlimited rights to 
those data.  However, the additional technical data required 
solely for the modification are owned by the company.  The 
Government only retains unlimited rights in the original, 
unchanged portion of the data package. [Ref.25]  How often 
will the Government be satisfied with procuring items 
without the modifications? How long will industry keep 
providing the non-modified items to the Government?  It is 
believed that the answer to both questions is, "Not long". 
The Government, as with most buyers, will desire the "new 
and improved" versions of the items purchased.  This would 
be especially true if the modifications deal with safety. 
Industry will not be able to economically provide the non- 
modified items over the long-run.  It is believed that the 
price of the non-modified items would be higher even over 
the short-run as well. 
What this appears to mean is that the Government must 
find a method by which industry can protect their commercial 
rights while the Government gets the technical data required 
to operate their items. 
The Government desires to have a separate contract 
clause which would allow them to have an unlimited license 
for data which is statutorily exempt from use or disclosure 
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restrictions. (These exemptions are found in DFARS 252.227- 
7013 (b), (i) through (viii).)  Although both parties are 
seeking differentiation between noncommercial and commercial 
items, it is doubted whether a statutory clause is needed 
for rights guaranteed in another DFARS clause.  It would be 
sufficient to specifically address the commercial and 
noncommercial application in DFARS 252.227-7013 (b). 
Industry representatives are concerned by the 
Government's ability to disclose form, fit, or function data 
for commercial items without restriction because of the 
possible negative impact on commercial business.  10 U.S.C. 
2320 (a), (2) states that form, fit, or function data cannot 
be restricted for Government use.  Since the political 
pressures are currently aimed at using commercial items in 
more applications for Government procurements, Government 
procuring agencies have a vested interest in promoting the 
use of commercial items.  If industry is not afforded 
statutory protection, they will be most unwilling to use 
commercial items. [Ref.10] 
6.  Copyrights, Patents and Trade Secrets 
It is believed that the recommendation of the 
Government-Industry Technical Data Advisory Committee to 
combine the copyright license and the data rights license is 
not  the best solution.  The Committee recommends that "the 
Government, and others acting on its behalf...(shall have 
license rights) to reproduce, modify, perform, display, or 
distribute the data."  [Ref.4, p.23]  These words are taken 
directly from copyright law and only address protection 
against copying existing data; they do not address the 
protection afforded to the idea contained within the medium. 
The idea is the actual object of worth to industry and the 
Government and must receive adequate protection.  Current 
versions of the FAR and DFARS do not specifically address 
the concept of the idea(s) associated with technical data. 
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Both parties need to understand what is protected and what 
is not in the Government statutes through a thorough and 
specifically worded FAR and DFARS. 
7.  Data Repositories 
This particular area is one of the more central topics 
in the CALS system.  It appears that Government's concerns 
center around the lack of resources capable of being devoted 
to having centralized Government repositories.  Industry 
seems concerned with frequent occurrences of missing, 
incomplete, or obsolete data at the Government's data 
repositories. 
The mere thought of possibly having as many 
repositories as prime contractors is staggering.  Several 
questions immediately come to mind, including: "What are the 
competition implications encountered during the quest to 
find these ultimate data managers?", "How will this affect 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 
provisions that protect Government employees that work on 
jobs that are inherently governmental?", "Who is going to 
pay for this effort?" This type of arrangement could 
adversely affect subcontractors who would typically be 
possible vendors but who are also competitors with the prime 
contractor.  It is doubtful that the prime contractor would 
make technical data available to the subcontractor in this 
case. 
To allow this type of arrangement, certain 
considerations by both parties would need to be made in 
order to support a workable system without undue burden 
being placed upon one party. With the existing trepidations 
already facing the success of CALS it would be unwise to add 
to them in this manner. 
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8.  Proposed Regulation Changes 
As proposed by the Committee, these proposed regulation 
changes concerning technical data rights will affect the 
CALS environment by their affect on those who are using CALS 
and the environment in which it's operated. 
The Committee has chosen two circumstances in which the 
existing procedure is maintained: using the funding source 
of data development as the allocation method to allocate 
data rights and the definition of "developed data." 
For CALS, maintaining funding as the data allocation 
method means that the data developers will continue to 
exercise control over the technical data.  However, they 
won't have as much control if their proposal of having the 
Government receive limited rights as a default condition was 
recommended.  The non-developers will have to pay for access 
to the data owned by the companies and will have "free" 
access only to the Government-owned or licensed data. They 
will also have to remember that all implementing regulations 
will emphasize that all Government rights stem from a 
license granted by the data creator.  This philosophy goes 
along well with the existing CALS structure of having prime 
contractors as data repository facilities.  Based solely on 
this criterion,  the numbers of data developing contractors 
who are willing to use CALS may increase.  If these 
contractors are able to keep ownership of data they have 
developed and if they are put in charge of their databases, 
more will view CALS as an attractive tool.  However, the 
non-developers of technical data will be less attracted to 
CALS.  Generally, these contractors are smaller businesses 
who don't have the resources available to develop technical 
data.  They must then rely on the Government and the data 
developers to provide them with database access. 
By keeping the definition of "developed data" as it exists 
and virtually discarding the capabilities of CAD and other 
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computer simulation tools, the Government has once again 
slowed the integration of the computer into procurement. 
While there are needs to ensure that the computer simulation 
techniques are "tried and true," the overall perception that 
seems to be held by the Government is that a computer is not 
to be trusted. This perception is also held for CALS 
itself.  It seems that the Government is seeking guarantees 
for this aspect of technical data and will not settle for 
anything less. 
The larger, data developing companies would be impacted 
by this decision less than the smaller, non-developers in 
CALS, unless these companies had already invested heavily in 
computer simulation systems.  The developers would have the 
resources to physically test their items for existence and 
workability.  The non-developers would like to move toward 
computer simulation of these requirements because of less 
resource commitment and the equalizing effect that automated 
processes can have on large company, small company 
irregularities, such as economies-of-scale. 
The Committee chose three areas that are seen to 
increase the integration of commercial activity and have a 
positive impact on CALS: the redefinition of indirect costs, 
the separation of commercial items from noncommercial items, 
and the enumeration of copyright license rights. 
By redefining indirect costs, the Committee apparently 
realizes that this issue is one of the most critical to 
technical data rights and CALS. The new definition proposal 
serves to provide both clarity and simplicity to an area 
that has traditionally been one of great confusion and 
misunderstanding.  The data developing companies will no 
longer fear that the Government may take over data rights 
control over property that was developed while under a 
Government contract but with private funds.  This increased 
integration helps CALS by attracting more data developing 
67 
firms into the Government marketplace. This additional 
method of protecting a company's technical data will provide 
database security that many contractors are wary of under 
the current guidelines and operating procedures for CALS. 
This new definition may also provide impetus for 
nondeveloping firms to become data developers.  Increased 
ownership boundaries and rights restrictions could mean 
needed product and company differentiation for survival in 
the marketplace. 
The separation of commercial items carries the same 
type of implications.  Increased integration of the 
Government and commercial markets will attract additional 
companies into the arena.  For CALS, it carries the message 
that data developing companies won't have to be concerned 
with exposing commercial data, that is under the same data 
rights restrictions as noncommercial data, in a shared 
database system. 
The specification and enumeration of copyright licenses 
will provide significant protection for data developers in 
CALS.  There is confusion on all sides as to the protection 
afforded by copyrights and data rights licenses. The 
separation of these rights categories will provide 
clarification and an increased willingness for companies to 
put protected data on a CDRL and a shared database. 
Therefore, the number of data developing companies attracted 
to CALS should increase.  Because of this additional 
protection, the level of competition will undoubtedly rise 
as well. 
The recommendation of the Committee to allow the 
possible use of prime contractors as data repositories 
doesn't make any sense for CALS.  There is an acknowledged 
lack of information concerning implementation costs, the 
subsequent effect on competition, subcontractor data rights, 
and general inefficiencies that would be the result of a 
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decentralized approach such as this.  It is believed that 
prime contractors would shrink away from CALS if they were 
called upon to manage a database that could be of tremendous 
volume.  They would be required to have large amounts of 
hardware, software, and personnel to accomplish this feat. 
Subcontractors will hesitate to put their data on the CALS 
database because of prime contractor control.  If the prime 
contractor is controlling and managing the database, how 
will the subcontractor maintain access security? 
There is one area that was proposed by the Committee 
that is seen as a possible deterrent to commercial 
integration, competition and CALS: the establishment of a 
fixed set of Government purpose rights. 
This proposal seems to weaken the competitive 
attraction of companies to the Government procurement arena. 
Anytime the Government dictates data rights that are 
different from those found in the normal commercial market, 
there will be decreases seen in the numbers in the 
Government market.  The five-year restriction period will 
probably assist the non-developers in conducting business in 
direct foreign sales and spare parts since the Government 
receives unlimited rights at the end of the restriction 
period. However, the non-developer's business is not the 
focal point of CALS while major weapon system procurement 
is.  This restriction time will tend to discourage 
commercialization and entry into the Government marketplace 
for data developing companies. 
H.  SUMMARY 
In the preceding Chapter, there have been many concepts 
and ideas presented. 
By analyzing the origin and restrictions of technical 
data rights, several problem areas were found. Too many 
organizations were found to segregate their contracting and 
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technical personnel. This results in unexplained and often 
times excessive data requirements that cannot be explained. 
Because of this division, contracting people usually do not 
ask questions as to whether the technical data are necessary 
in the procurement. Many of the contracting personnel are 
unfamiliar with the different data rights categories and are 
not sufficiently trained in the differences between data 
access and data ownership. Historically, the Government has 
attempted to overly restrict technical data rights and has 
driven away commercial integration.  While there are 
indications that the Government has reversed this attitude, 
one must be wary of an over-correction that could result in 
a detrimental situation to the Government. 
The marketplace for CALS can be an attractive one for 
industry, but not at this time.  Industry has not been 
apprised and convinced of the benefits that CALS offers. 
There has not been a CALS advocate to present CALS 
attributes to members of the marketplace and keep CALS in 
the forefront of the industry mindset. There has not been 
an adequate addressing of incentives that would stimulate 
industry and Government enthusiasm.  These needed incentives 
include: providing a long-term cost-benefit analysis of the 
CALS initiative, establishing a set of technical data 
standards that deal with compatible languages, developing a 
standard contract language that removes technical data 
rights confusion, and data access and delivery methods. 
Industry is fearful that the desired security and control 
over their technical data will be sacrificed in a CALS 
environment. 
There are several protective actions that are regularly 
being sought by industry to protect technical data and 
intellectual property.  Analysis indicates that there is 
confusion as to the protective coverage offered by these 
actions: copyrights, patents, and trade secrets.  This 
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confusion is aggravated by unclear wording in the FAR and 
DFARS as to what coverage is associated with technical data 
rights and under what particular circumstances they apply. 
There are pending regulation changes proposed by a 
Government-Industry Technical Data Advisory Committee that 
seek to clarify this and other areas of confusion.  Other 
implications of these changes include increased data and 
intellectual property ownership and rights for the data 
developing companies, separate treatment of commercial and 
noncommercial items, and the establishment of a fixed rights 
restriction category of GPLR.  The implications for non-data 
developing companies are that they will not have the degree 
of access that they had when the Government often claimed 
unlimited rights.  This will impact their ability to conduct 
business. 
Generally, CALS has been initiated without a viable 
strategy for attaining success.  From its inception, CALS 
has been presented in a fragmented manner that has not 
attracted commercial industry as was initially hoped for. 
There have not been any known attempts to use existing tools 
such as Total Quality Management/Total Quality Leadership 
(TQM/TQL) to analyze the procurement process or to use CALS 
as an enabler of TQM/TQL change.  Too often, the 
Government's arcane attitude and perceptions about computer 
assets have been major stumbling blocks that only hinder 
the procurement process. 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.   CONCLUSIONS 
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from 
the previous discussions presented in this thesis. The best 
method in which to present these conclusions is in the form 
of answering the research questions introduced in Chapter I. 
Answers to the subsidiary questions will be provided first 
in the conclusions section. A generalized overview will be 
provided at the end of the conclusion section. Because of 
the nature of the primary research question, it will be 
answered in the recommendations section of this thesis. 
1.  Subsidiary Research Questions 
The three technical data rights restriction categories: 
unlimited, limited, and GPLR are based primarily upon the 
funding source. These three categories can be negotiated for 
situations that are extraordinary. This ability to 
negotiate is one of the major keys to data rights 
restriction flexibility.  If the data developers or data 
owners are adequately compensated for their data, they will 
surrender data ownership privileges.  In order for the 
Government to effectively negotiate for technical data 
rights, they must be able to effectively identify the 
technical data that are actually required, not be excessive 
in their desires for data access or data ownership.  The 
Government must also be acutely aware of the cost of the 
technical data they are negotiating for and the scope of the 
data application. 
The origins of the data restrictions are not understood 
or controlled by the Government and industry. These origins 
are found in four different areas: detailed assessment of 
technical data (including a thorough cost-benefit analysis) 
during the early phases of weapon system acquisition; the 
relationship between technical experts, who develop the data 
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requirements, and contracting personnel, who apply these 
requirements to a procurement action; and proper 
construction of the Government's solicitation. 
There is not sufficient training between the technical 
experts who derive the data requirements and the contracting 
personnel who apply the data requirements to a specific 
procurement action. Training will benefit the abilities of 
both parties to be able to minimize conflicts and confusion 
before they have a chance to start. 
Regular, detailed assessments of technical data 
requirements early in the acquisition of weapon systems do 
not occur.  These assessments would require more foresight 
on the parts of the procurement officials than ever before, 
but would save the Government significant amounts of money 
on additional data requirements identified in the later 
production phase of weapon systems acquisitions. 
If the regulation proposals dealing with data rights 
restrictions are instituted as previously discussed, CALS 
will be impacted through the virtual monopoly of ownership 
held by the data developers, who are usually large 
companies. The non-data developers--the small businesses-- 
will be put into a situation of paying for data they might 
otherwise have received gratis from the Government. 
The manner in which the Government and industry treats 
technical data and intellectual property has a profound 
affect on the marketplace.  Industry's greatest concern with 
the protection of their data and property is that it often 
provides them with product or service differentiation needed 
for company survival.  If this protection level is 
sacrificed, they are vulnerable to competition.  This 
scenario is true for the current industrial base.  Industry 
realizes that technical data are vital to the defense 
industry, but does not desire to relinquish data rights 
ownership unless the level of compensation is adequate. 
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Industry will use and support an automated shared data 
base system if it is shown to be more profitable than other 
methods.  Industry is a profit-oriented entity that requires 
some type of metric to prove that CALS is cost effective and 
secure to use. 
The Government needs to change both the actual ways in 
which they deal with automated procurement and technical 
data rights and the perception by industry that the 
Government is ill-suited to operate and manage a high- 
technological, complex procurement system such as CALS. 
[Ref.10] 
Technical data rights are important to the Government 
because of competition requirements found in the FAR and 
DFARS, and in statutes such as CICA.  The Government is also 
very concerned with having alternative supply sources for 
weapon systems.  They do not want to be totally dependent 
upon the actions or inactions of a sole source for systems 
that fill national security requirements.  However, the 
Government needs to get serious about the true direction 
they want to proceed in.  Is the quest for alternative 
supply sourcing still a viable goal?  Is the Government 
striving to reach a "fair and reasonable price" for 
technical data or is it searching for the lowest possible 
price? 
Because of the value and uniqueness of technical data 
and intellectual property, there are several methods used to 
protect it.  Copyrights, patents, treating data as trade 
secrets, and restrictive markings on the contractor's 
proposal are the most common protective actions found in 
Government-industry procurement actions. Additional data 
access methods such as CITIS are designed to provide data 
protection in a shared database/CALS environment. 
Companies do use variations of the basic non-CALS 
safeguards when dealing within their industry. While these 
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protective actions are found in abundance, there are built- 
in limitations found in each.  While the Government has 
historically used these limitations to their advantage, the 
current data user is more apt to find that the Government is 
much more considerate of these protective measures and tends 
to abide by them.  The Government seems to be aware that 
while the call for competition still exists, there also 
exists the realities of a shrinking corporate resource base. 
This makes the Government more keen in keeping the 
productive, sound contractors happy.  On the other hand, 
industry is quite aware that the Government's tendencies 
have changed and will continue to use all available forms of 
technical data and intellectual property protection. 
All of these protective measures will continue to be 
used in the CALS environment.  It is believed that 
additional emphasis will be placed upon protecting the 
technical data in a CALS scenario since the access to the 
data and the disclosure of the idea behind the data will be 
to a possibly wider audience under less direct control. 
The impact of CALS upon technical data and intellectual 
property rights are significant.  The current trends point 
to the Government allowing more contractor control over 
their own technical data and intellectual property.  This 
new freedom of rights will result in the contractors 
mandating that CALS provide significant, measurable 
advantages over other possible procurement methods. 
Industry will be looking for standards in the development of 
digital data access, storage and delivery, security 
measures, and data contracting that will, in turn, maintain 
their data and property rights. The infrastructure of CALS 
will be dependent on the possible combination of technical 
data and intellectual property rights held by a company. 
Since a key element of CALS is to provide standard data 
exchange for DOD and industry [Ref.18, p.2], the rights 
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associated with the data will act as the independent 
variable while the data to be exchanged will be the 
dependent variables of this complex equation. 
While the impact of technical data and intellectual 
property rights is significant on the current and future 
procurement process, the regulations, policies, and 
documents that address this topic are few and relatively 
narrow in scope. The FAR and DFARS address technical data 
and data rights in broad strokes but do not discuss them in 
the context of automated procurement actions such as CALS. 
DOD Directive 5000.1, DOD Instruction 5000.2, and Military 
Handbook 59A include discussion of digital data in 
procurement but are vague in their approach.  The proposed 
regulation changes that have been presented in this thesis 
involve only the FAR and DFARS. No clarification or 
simplification has been officially proposed in CALS-specific 
guidelines but is severely required to assist the 
implementation of CALS. These documents should be revised 
so as to be specific and address the requirements and 
situations that will be encountered by the users of CALS. 
The actual use of the technical data or intellectual 
property, and the protection afforded, needs to be of 
greater concern.  In a CALS setting, a clarification of 
these protective measures would foster better feelings among 
the possible industry participants about the security of 
their information in case of an unauthorized disclosure. 
In addition to these statute-supported protective 
methods, the CITIS concept does not provide standardization 
for CALS users.  Contractors are currently using their own 
data access to ensure compatibility within their own 
organizations while sacrificing the wider, basic requirement 
for standardization within the CALS environment. 
77 
2.  Generalized Overview 
CALS is a technological initiative that has had 
problems related to technical data rights and intellectual 
property from the beginning of the program. The overall 
problem stems from a lack of structure, i.e. a lack of 
managerial direction and guidance, a lack of cost controls, 
a lack of data standardization, and a lack of data 
assessment. 
Regulations and policies provide standardization and a 
pathway for executing any program within DOD. The 
regulations and policies for CALS and technical data rights 
do not provide these requirements.  Personnel 
responsibilities are unclear.  Each DOD Service component is 
implementing CALS on its own volition because only general 
guidance is formally provided. There is a lack of precise 
contracting language, and working definitions of terms are 
not provided. 
Most of the defense contractors are wary of exposing 
their technical data on a Government operated, shared data 
base.  The lack of incentives for using CALS and the lack of 
a true definitive goal for and definition of CALS have 
slowed its implementation, and serves as further indications 
to industry that the program may be in trouble.  Contractors 
know that they can sometimes ignore a program that appears 
to be in trouble and wait for the Government to develop 
another program that will receive the needed support.  CALS 
needs this additional support to prevent being ignored and 
slowly phased out. 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.  Research Questions 
To properly answer the primary research question, the 
aspects discussed in the Data Analysis Chapter, (Chapter 
III), must be addressed.  Therefore, the recommendations in 
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this section will be presented in the order in which they 
were introduced in Chapter III, and together they will 
provide the answer required for the primary research 
question. 
In order to properly construct data restrictions, the 
originating sources must be correctly utilized and 
controlled. To do this, the first recommendation would be 
to implement detailed assessments of technical data in the 
early phases of weapon system acquisition. This assessment 
needs to be conducted during the engineering and 
manufacturing phase (phase II of the weapon system 
acquisition process). This assessment should also include a 
thorough cost analysis of the data requirements.  The 
Government should make more use of the "Rough Order of 
Magnitude" (ROM) which allows the "standard price" concept 
to be used as a budgetary input figure but doesn't require 
all of the paperwork required by the FAR.  [Ref.6]  The 
second recommendation involves the training of technical 
experts and contracting personnel.  This training should 
involve information not only on technical data and 
intellectual property rights in the context of their own 
jobs, but should also include information on the other job 
area. 
Emphasis on the correct use of the Government's 
solicitation should be made.  Instead of using the 
solicitation as a "wish list," it should be used to acquire 
access or ownership to the minimum essential technical data 
required for that particular procurement action. Again, 
training the personnel providing inputs to the solicitation 
will provide the quickest, most effective results. 
To follow up on the recommendation stated above, the 
establishment of standard contracting language for CALS is 
recommended. Too often, the legal language entraps the 
contracting officer into a less-than-ideal contracting 
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Situation for procurements involving digital data. 
The importance of technical data in both the commercial 
and Government marketplace has been well-documented. A 
recommendation is for the CALS-Industry Steering Group and 
the Government-Industry Technical Data Advisory Committee to 
join forces with industry representatives. They should 
concentrate on having the Government provide the same type 
of technical data protection as is offered in commercial 
business.  If this is not done, DOD and other Government 
agencies will suffer a loss of a significant portion of 
their much-needed industrial base resource. 
It is recommended that the impetus for the acquisition 
of technical data by the Government be reexamined. The days 
of buying technical data because no one wants to be accused 
of not doing their job, or buying technical data on a 
"cookie cutter" approach is over.  While it is recognized 
that there are competition requirements to meet, competition 
is not appropriate for every procurement. Alternative 
sourcing should be examined.  It isn't too often that the 
Government has to go out for entirely new supply sources. 
Alternative sourcing should be used only for extreme 
emergencies such as war.  To accomplish this recommendation, 
CICA should be revised to account for additional freedom in 
determining the need for competition by providing guiding 
principles instead of rigid procedures. 
Cost is another area that needs improvement when 
analyzing the impetus for technical data procurement by the 
Government.  The cost drivers involved in technical data 
need to be properly identified and accounted for.  Once this 
has been accomplished, a proper long-term cost-benefit 
analysis should be conducted.  How the data are priced per 
contract should be a focal point.  The pricing of technical 
data needs to be done for every procurement, not just for 
contracts over $100,000.  Procuring Contracting Officers and 
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Program Managers need to be fully aware of the cost of the 
technical data at all times.  For CALS, technical data 
access costs need to be accumulated by each contractor to 
avoid double-charging the Government for the same data. 
To allow proper monitoring of CALS costs and benefits, 
CALS should receive a separate budget line-item. This would 
greatly help the Government and industry track CALS costs 
and system progress. 
The impact of CALS upon technical data and intellectual 
property rights will only be beneficial and meaningful if 
CALS itself is presented to industry as a beneficial and 
meaningful system.  Full Government support must be given to 
CALS in order for CALS to be successful. This support can 
come from initiating a specific definition of CALS, specific 
goals, specific incentives, specific standards to follow, 
and specific guidelines. 
Once these steps have been taken, the impact of CALS 
upon technical data and intellectual property rights can be 
controlled by the Government, providing standardized methods 
for the data and property along with standard methods of 
dealing with the inevitable issues and disputes that will 
arise.  Among the possible areas in which questions and 
arguments may arise are recompetition of products that were 
once sole source and are now being procured under a 
competitive scenario and existing programs that are now 
seeking to implement CALS. 
One must realize that CALS treatment of technical data 
and intellectual property rights must be dealt with 
uniformly and in concert with the treatment these areas 
receive in the commercial marketplace.  If they are not, 
industry will not be drawn into the CALS arena.  Therefore, 
a recommendation is made to align CALS technical data and 
intellectual property treatment with that found in industry. 
The one aspect of CALS that appears to impact data 
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rights more than others is data access security.  CITIS 
needs to be standardized in its implementation, JCALS needs 
to be implemented to allow it to be connected to CALS 
installations which will provide the single point of entry 
to the data base, and security methods need to be 
standardized and used by all participants. Until access 
security can be guaranteed and demonstrated to CALS users, 
CALS will not be successful. 
The proposed regulation changes need to be reexamined 
to determine the impact they will have on small, non-data 
developing firms.  It is believed that the proposals favor 
the larger, data developing companies that have the 
resources to fund and provide the data required by the 
Government.  It is suspected that this will affect the 
composition of players in the CALS system, and the 
socioeconomic demands that have been placed on the 
Government in the area of small business incentives. 
The regulation change proposals should be expanded to 
include revisions to DODD 5000.1, DODI 5000.2, and MIL-HDBK 
59A.  In constructing these proposals, representatives from 
the Government, including those at the user level, and 
industry should be assigned to work in concert with the goal 
of providing new guidance. This guidance must be 
crystallized enough to enable those at the middle management 
level to know how to best implement these guidelines in 
order for the users to make CALS work in the most efficient 
manner possible. 
As far as the specific regulation proposals, funding 
should be used for the technical data rights allocation 
basis.  The assumption of risk that is undertaken by a 
company to develop technical data or intellectual property 
is in need of compensation.  It is believed that the best 
compensation in this situation is the awarding of ownership. 
The development of new technology is something that the 
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Government cannot afford to discourage.  Funding should be 
the determining factor in this situation. Therefore, it is 
recommended that the "required for performance" criterion be 
eliminated.  Included in the guidelines for determining when 
data are actually "developed", it is recommended that the 
Government begin using computer simulation tools such as 
CAD. Decreases in cost and time spent on data development 
can be used to benefit both the Government and industry, and 
should be done so at the earliest possible time. 
The definitions of expenses and indirect costs should 
be modified.  This will not only encourage new technological 
advances from large, data developer companies but will 
encourage the smaller companies to develop their own data. 
The treatment of commercial items should be handled 
separately in the FAR and DFARS.  It is cost effective and 
good business sense for the Government to encourage the 
expanded use of commercial items in the Government 
marketplace.  If the separation of commercial items does not 
materialize, the Government will lose some of the incentive 
for the integration of this area into Government business. 
The recommendation for data copyrights, patents, and 
trade secrets would be to clarify and simplify the language 
associated with these areas.  In addition to including 
language that addresses copyright licensing rights, 
protection of the idea needs to be addressed and emphasized. 
Currently, the Government does not have the capability 
to store contractor technical data [Ref.4, p.50].  However, 
the alternative method of having the prime contractors act 
as data repositories cannot work.  It is recommended that 
this area receive additional investigation as to whether a 
centralized repository can be instituted efficiently and 
effectively. 
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2.  Summary 
The Government needs to change their attitudes about 
automated procurement and the perceptions that industry has 
about the Government. While the Government has taken 
strides to improve the way in which they abide by the 
protective methods used by companies in protecting their 
technical data, they have not done enough.  Industry and the 
Government must feel better about using CALS in a general 
sense before any improvements in technical data and 
intellectual property rights will have the desired effect. 
Among those items: providing a clear definition of CALS and 
its goals and a strategy for achieving those goals; 
definitive, clear guidelines, regulations and policies; 
meaningful metrics for CALS performance; a complete cost- 
benefit analysis of CALS and its peripheral subsystems; a 
feedback system for involving industry in the implementation 
and use of CALS; and standardized methods for digitizing 
data, for writing contracts, and system implementation is 
recommended.  Additionally, the Government should use 
existing initiatives such as TQM/TQL to improve the 
procurement process and to use CALS as a method in which to 
allow this change. 
C.   RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Once the cost elements of technical data and 
intellectual data rights have been established, a thorough 
cost-benefit analysis of CALS and its associated systems 
would be most beneficial. Determinations of what 
environments and applications would be most compatible and 
those not compatible with CALS would greatly assist both the 
Government's and industry's implementation plans. 
A second area that would be worthy of further 
examination would be how CALS and automated procurement 
treatment of technical data and intellectual property rights 
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would be held in an international climate. The research 
should use existing or proposed U.S. policies as a template 
and determine the changes that would be necessary. 
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Administrative Contracting Officer 
Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Procurement and Logistics) 
Armed Services Pricing Manual 
Computer-aided Design 
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Cycle Support 
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Cycle Implementation Plan 
Cost Accounting Standards 
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Contractor Integrated Technical 
Information System 
Contract Line-Item Number 
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Defense Acquisition Regulatory 
Council 
Defense Contract Audit Agency 
Defense Logistics Agency 
Defense Federal Acquisition 
Regulation Supplement 
Defense Logistics Studies 
Information Exchange 
Department Of Defense 
Department Of Defense Directive 
Department Of Defense Instruction 
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Center 
Digital Storage and Retrieval 
Engineering Data System 
























Final Cost Objective 
Global Distributed Data Management 
Government Purpose License Rights 
Integrated Logistics Support 
Independent Research and 
Development 
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Life-Cycle Support 
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Military Handbook 
Military Standard 
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Office of Management and Budget 
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Procuring Contracting Officer 
Procurement Management Review 
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Request For Proposal 
Rough Order of Magnitude 
Statement Of Work 
Total Quality Management/Total 
Quality Leadership 
Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition and Technology) 
88 
APPENDIX B.  PRELIMINARY SURVEY (CONTRACTOR) 
1. Do any of your company's Government contracts involve a 
shared database configuration? If so, what percentage of 
the contracts do so? 
2. Are any of the shared database applications described in 
question #1 a CALS (Continuous Acquisition Life Cycle) 
system? 
3. Have technical data or intellectual property rights been 
a consideration when conducting the automated procurements? 
4. How did you first learn of the Government's need for 
technical data for the procurement? 
5. Do you use patents, copyrights, or other protective 
measures to protect your company's technical data or 
intellectual property? If so, which is the most effective 
and why is it the most effective? 
6. What has motivated you/your company to use CALS/a shared 
database system?  If you don't use either, why not? 
7„  What Government regulations are used in dealing with 
technical data/intellectual property rights issues? What 
would you do to improve them? 




APPENDIX C.  PRELIMINARY SURVEY (GOVERNMENT) 
1. Who is responsible for determining the amount and types 
of technical data/intellectual property required for a 
particular procurement? 
2. What served as the impetus for the technical data 
restrictions? 
3. Which technical data rights restrictions cause the most 
problems in contract negotiations? 
4. If the Government desires more technical data rights 
than the contractor initially offers, how is it handled? 
5c Why is technical data/intellectual property important to 
the Government? 
6. What guidelines and regulations are used when dealing 
with technical data and intellectual property rights? What 
should be done to improve these sources? 
7. What actions are followed when a contractor's proposal 
includes restrictive markings that are deemed adequate?  If 
they're deemed inadequate? 
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APPENDIX D.  FINAL SURVEY (CONTRACTOR) 
1. What is your experience in using a shared database/the 
Continuous Acquisition Life Cycle (CALS) System? 
2. What is the application of the shared database or CALS? 
3. How did you first become aware of the Government's 
restrictions/requirements pertaining to technical data for a 
procurement? 
4. Describe the differences found in the treatment of 
technical data/intellectual property in the commercial 
marketplace versus the Government marketplace. 
5. What measures are used in your company to protect 
technical data/intellectual property? 
6. In your opinion, does the Government seek the correct 
restrictions on technical data? Does it seek the correct 
amount of technical data/intellectual property? 
7. What motivated your company to use/not use CALS? 
8. What are the differences between the methods in which 
commercial companies handle technical data/intellectual 
property rights issues and the methods used by the 
Government? How can these differences be minimized? 
9. Describe the impact your CALS system/shared database 
system has had on technical data/intellectual property 
rights? 
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10. Describe the methods used by your company to price 
technical data/intellectual property. 
11. If your company uses CALS, was a Contractor Integrated 
Technical Information Service (CITIS) used? A Government 
Concepts of Operations (GCO) provided? A CALS 
Implementation Plan (CALSIP) used by your company? Were 
there problems with these? 
12. Is the shared database/CALS satisfying your procurement 
needs? 
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APPENDIX E.  FINAL SURVEY (GOVERNMENT) 
1. How are the technical data/intellectual property rights 
restrictions developed? 
2. Who decides the amount and restrictions of technical 
data/intellectual property that will be sought for the 
procurement? 
3. What provides the impetus for technical 
data/intellectual property acquisition and restrictions? 
4. Which technical data rights restrictions cause the most 
problems during contract negotiations? The least problems? 
5. What is your criteria for nonacceptance of the 
contractor's restrictive markings on the technical data? 
6. When are the costs of technical data/intellectual 
property considered? Are technical data priced for all 
procurements? 
7. What alternatives to acquiring the technical 
data/intellectual property are used? 
8. What percentage of the contracts in your activity are 
handled via CALS or a shared database system? 
9. What are the advantages of CALS or a shared database? 
The disadvantages? 
10. Is there a difference of opinion between the Government 
and industry concerning technical data/intellectual property 
rights? What are they? 
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11. How can the differences described in question #10 be 
improved? 
12. What regulations or guidelines are used when dealing 
with technical data/intellectual property issues? How can 
these sources be improved? 
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APPENDIX F.  MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION OF CALS 
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
(ACQUISITION) 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
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Source: Government-Industry Technical Data Advisory Committee 
Report to the Secretary of Defense, April 6, 1994. 
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